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ABSTRACT
There is a vast and growing cause lawyering literature demon-
strating how attorneys and their relationship to social justice move-
ments matter greatly for law’s ability to engender progress. But to
date, there has been no examination of the work of ADA disability
cause lawyers as cause lawyers. Similarly, despite an extensive lit-
erature focused on the ADA’s revolutionary civil rights aspects and
the manner in which the Supreme Court’s interpretation of that
statute has stymied potential transformation of American society, no
academic accounts of disability law have focused on the lawyers who
bring these cases.
This Article responds to these scholarly voids. We conducted in-
depth interviews with many of the nation’s leading disability rights
cause lawyers. What we found makes three novel contributions. As
the first examination of the activities of these public interest lawyers
and their advocacy, it brings to light a neglected sector of an other-
wise well-examined field. In doing so, this Article complements, but
also  complicates,  the  cause  lawyering  literature  by  presenting  a
vibrant and successful cohort of social movement lawyers who in
* J. Howard Ziemann Fellow and Professor of Law, Associate Dean of Research and
Academic Centers, Loyola Law School Los Angeles.
We  thank  Scott  Cummings,  Orly  Lobel,  Doug  NeJaime,  Ann  Southworth,  Sasha
Natapoff,  and  Kathleen  Kim  for  comments  and  productive  conversations;  Jamie  Egan,
Nicholas  Heiderstadt,  Laura  Jacobson,  and  Nicole  Sonia  for  research  assistance;  and
participants at Emory, Harvard, San Diego, UC Irvine, and William & Mary workshops for
feedback.  We  dedicate  this  Article  to  the  memory  of  disability  rights  advocate,  EEOC
Commissioner, White House advisor, and law professor, Paul Miller. He was a dear friend
and is sorely missed. 
** Cabell Research Professor, William & Mary School of Law, Executive  Director,
Harvard Law School Project on Disability, and Visiting Professor, Harvard Law School.
*** Lester Kissell Professor, Vice Dean for Global Initiatives on the Legal Profession
and Director of the Program on the Legal Profession, Harvard Law School.
12871288 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1287
some ways emulate their peers and in other ways have a unique
perspective and mode of operation. The Article also forces a reconsid-
eration  of  academic  critiques  of  the  efficacy  and  transformative
potential of the ADA because it demonstrates how disability cause
lawyers have effectively utilized the statute to achieve social integra-
tion in the shadow of the Court’s restrictive jurisprudence. 2012] DISABILITY CAUSE LAWYERS 1289
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[W]e’ve been filling a void that for decades has been out
there and [we have been] able to really have a fundamental
impact on the lives of millions of people with disabilities. It has
been an immense pleasure ... to use law as the instrument for
social change that I think it was designed for.
1
INTRODUCTION
Extensive  scholarship  has  explored  the  significance  of  the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) for creating social change.
These examinations have largely focused on the ADA’s revolution-
ary  civil  rights  aspects  and  the  manner  in  which  the  Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the statute has stymied potential trans-
formation of American society. Yet, despite considerable academic
analyses of the ADA, no study has focused on the lawyers who bring
these disability civil rights cases.
2 This is a significant omission
from an otherwise vast cause lawyering scholarship demonstrating
how attorneys and their relationship to social justice movements
matter greatly for law’s ability to engender progress.
3 In a compan-
ion piece, we began to explore the role of disability cause lawyers.
4
We noted that they differed from predecessor movement advocates
by eschewing Supreme Court constitutional litigation in favor of
lower federal court public accommodation cases that generated set-
tlements and rulings affecting large numbers of people with diverse
disabilities.
5 
1. Interview with Lawyer 13 (Feb. 21, 2011). In order to preserve the anonymity of our
sources, we have identified each lawyer using the generic “Lawyer” title and assigned each
a  number.  To  further  protect  their  identities,  we  have  removed  all  reference  to  their
employers and, in some cases, geographic location. This procedure is in accordance with
protocols  of  the  Institutional  Research  Board  (LMVIRB  2010  S-66).  IRB  approval  was
obtained for this project, and the certificate is on file with the authors. The audio recordings
and transcripts of these interviews are also on file with the authors.
2. A lone study describes the role of lawyers in drafting the ADA, but not lawyers’ public
interest litigation under the statute. See generally Neta Ziv, Cause Lawyers, Clients, and the
State: Congress as a Forum for Cause Lawyering During the Enactment of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, in CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA 211, 211-43 (Austin
Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2001). 
3. See id. at 215.
4. Michael Ashley Stein, Michael E. Waterstone & David B. Wilkins, Cause Lawyering
for People with Disabilities, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1658 (2010) (book review). 
5. Id. at 1663-64.2012] DISABILITY CAUSE LAWYERS 1291
This Article builds on our initial and unique research on the work
performed by disability cause lawyers after the ADA. We inter-
viewed the most active and nationally prominent disability rights
attorneys to gain a deeper understanding of their daily practice,
motivation, and self-awareness as leading advocates of the disability
rights movement. Why have they elected to bring cases in a manner
that diverges from that of predecessor civil rights movements? What
do they feel their ethical and fiduciary duties are to both their
immediate clients and to the broader disability rights community?
And what litigation tools and tactics do these cause lawyers feel are
best suited for achieving their goals—at a time characterized by a
Supreme Court that is averse to a progressive view of disability
rights as well as to civil rights more generally? 
This Article makes three novel contributions. It presents a snap-
shot, and helps tell the story, of disability cause lawyers’ activities.
The Article also begins situating disability cause lawyers within the
emerging literature on law and social movements. In both tactics
and strategy, disability cause lawyers operate similarly to lawyers
for other causes. Yet, given the unique political and historical con-
text of the disability rights movement, some important differences
emerge that enlarge the understanding of what it means to be a
cause lawyer. Finally, the Article forces a reconsideration of aca-
demic critiques of the efficacy and transformative potential of the
ADA by demonstrating the ways that disability cause lawyers have
effectively  used  the  statute  to  achieve  social  integration  in  the
shadow of the Court’s restrictive jurisprudence. 
The  classic  archetype  of  cause  lawyering  remains  the  heroic
struggles of the Legal Defense Fund against American apartheid
culminating in Brown v. Board of Education,
6 and depicts lawyers
as  the  central  actors  who  conceived  and  led  the  fight  against
segregation.
7 This iconic view has been challenged on the ground
that cause lawyers were overly optimistic for believing constitu-
tional  litigation  would  remedy  their  movement’s  plight,
8  and
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7. See, e.g., MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND
THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961 (1994).
8. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? 336-43 (1991).1292 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1287
furthermore were elitists who controlled and papered over schisms
within their constituencies while striving to present their cases
before the Supreme Court.
9 More recent iterations of cause lawyer-
ing take into account the activities of attorneys acting, respectively,
on behalf of politically conservative groups
10 and gays and lesbians
seeking equality.
11 What emerges is a more complex dynamic that
acknowledges the traditional role lawyers and litigation play while
at the same time assessing the prospects for winning political vic-
tories through courtroom defeats.
12 Modern social movement law-
yers are also more successful in lobbying legislatures as an effective
and nonlitigious means of serving their communities, while viewing
advocacy as a multidimensional process.
13 
In discussing their successes and failures, disability cause law-
yers bear little resemblance to “single-minded and politically naive
rights crusaders” who succumb to a myth of rights and a simplistic
view of the interplay between litigation and social change.
14 Rather,
these lawyers closely dovetail with advocates for political conserva-
tives and gay and lesbian groups who view litigation as one form of
a larger mobilization strategy,
15 engage in multiple forms of ad-
vocacy,
16 and have real, sustained connections to the communities
they serve.
17 In addition, disability cause lawyers resemble their
movement advocate peers in that their work generates radiating
effects on the targets of their litigation as well as potential allies
and the public;
18 mobilizes aligned constituencies within the move-
ment;
19 and generates media coverage that transforms disputes “in
9. See, e.g., Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of
Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1455-66 (2005). 
10. See,  e.g.,  ANN  SOUTHWORTH,  LAWYERS  OF  THE  RIGHT:  PROFESSIONALIZING  THE
CONSERVATIVE COALITION (2008). 
11. See, e.g., CARLOS A. BALL, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE COURTROOM: FIVE LGBT RIGHTS
LAWSUITS THAT HAVE CHANGED OUR NATION (2010).
12. See generally Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941 (2011).
13. See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
14. Ann  Southworth,  Lawyers  and  the  “Myth  of  Rights”  in  Civil  Rights  and  Poverty
Practice, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 469, 469 (1999). 
15. See infra note 249 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
17. See infra note 311 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 29-31 (1978).
19. See, e.g., JENNIFER  GORDON,  SUBURBAN  SWEATSHOPS:  THE  FIGHT  FOR IMMIGRANT
RIGHTS 65-66, 70-71 (2005); HELENA SILVERSTEIN, UNLEASHING RIGHTS: LAW, MEANING, AND2012] DISABILITY CAUSE LAWYERS 1293
ways  that  reassign  blame  and  responsibility.”
20  And  like  other
groups, disability cause lawyers are deft in securing new rights and
favorable interpretations of existing rights through legislative and
regulatory processes.
21
The disability cause lawyer interviews also highlight distinctions
from other social movement advocates that question and expand
existing understandings of cause lawyers. If we consider Brown v.
Board of Education as characterizing a “first wave” of cause law-
yering,
22 it presents an instance of a social movement in conflict
with an oppressive governmental structure, with the goal of toppling
formally instantiated inequality. Lawyers advancing gay and les-
bian equality, as well as conservative causes—a “second wave” of
cause lawyering—find themselves in consistent and repeated value
clashes, popularly thought of as culture wars. For example, advo-
cates for marriage equality consistently find themselves in conflict
with advocates for conservative groups. Similarly, the pro-life and
pro-choice movements are familiar adversaries, finding themselves
in opposition against each other in multiple forums. 
Post-ADA disability cause lawyers, however, find themselves in
a different historical and political context. Unlike other groups, they
began  with  an  omnibus  civil  rights  statute  enforceable  with  a
private right of action.
23 Moreover, there is no entrenched, large,
repetitive protagonist with which disability rights advocates consist-
ently battle. Rather, their task involves educating—and litigating
against when necessary—a broad range of employers, businesses,
and  public  entities.  Animus  is  not  typically  an  issue,  but  bias,
stigma, and concerns about cost are constant ideological adversar-
ies. 
Despite pursuing multilayered forms of advocacy, lawyers for
political conservatives and gays and lesbians have focused to some
extent  on  reaching  the  Supreme  Court.
24  In  contrast,  with  less
THE ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 232 (1996).
20. SOUTHWORTH, supra note 10, at 150. 
21. See, e.g., infra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
22. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
23. See infra text accompanying note 298.
24. See BALL, supra note 11, at 252-53 (noting that although a gradualist approach of legal
challenges up to the Supreme Court worked in the sodomy context, in other contexts, gay and
lesbian rights advocates sought to avoid Supreme Court review); SOUTHWORTH, supra note1294 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1287
centralization  and  a  better  legislative  starting  place,  disability
cause lawyers are exceptional for the extent to which they eschew
the Court. As one lawyer bluntly put it, “[I]f you don’t need the
Supreme Court, don’t use it.”
25 When these lawyers litigate, they are
primarily interested in winning through settlement or at the district
court level. This victory can then be leveraged to transform other
industry actors, ultimately creating cultural changes in the entities
they target. Many disability cause lawyers thus avoid employment
cases for the express reason that victories in that field, while impor-
tant, will redound only to individuals seeking individual remedies
and not benefit the greater community of persons with disabilities.
Moreover, our research revealed some instances where disability
cause lawyers operate more like corporate lawyers in that they
respond to the advocacy goals of their highly organized and well-
resourced clients. Sometimes this requires litigation, but in other
instances the legislature and administrative state are the preferred
forums.
26 Although scholars of other social justice groups have noted
that lawyers operate in lawmaking arenas outside the courts,
27
disability cause lawyers show particular deftness and comfort in
securing new rights and favorable interpretations of existing rights
through legislative and regulatory processes.
28
This research into the strategic motivations of modern disability
cause lawyers also yields new insight into how American disability
law functions in practice, and thereby both confirms and challenges
existing scholarship. Commentators have argued normatively for
the ADA’s progressive application and rebuked the Supreme Court’s
narrow gatekeeping definition of disability.
29 Their assessments
likewise have critiqued the ADA’s implementation and dourly as-
sessed its efficacy as a civil rights statute.
30 Despite the Court’s par-
simonious ADA jurisprudence, the disability cause lawyer inter-
views revealed a strikingly different picture in practice. The lawyers
10, at 152-58.
25. Interview with Lawyer 1 (Oct. 21, 2010).
26. See infra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics in the Era
Before Brown, 115 YALE L.J. 256, 260-61 (2005).
28. See infra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 320-21.
30. See infra notes 323-24 and accompanying text.2012] DISABILITY CAUSE LAWYERS 1295
generally  disagreed  with  the  Supreme  Court’s  ADA  decisions.
31
Indeed, many contributed to the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA)
that eventually revised those rulings. Yet, the Court’s judgments did
not  impact  their  daily  work.
32  Simply  put,  the  disability  cause
lawyers persisted in bringing public services and accommodations
cases on behalf of people who met even restrictive definitions of
disability and continued to secure meaningful changes in defen-
dants’ programs and businesses. 
In a similar vein, scholars have asserted that Supreme Court
decisions have undermined ADA enforcement by mooting civil rights
attorney fees.
33 The disability cause lawyers we interviewed ac-
knowledged that these rulings negatively affected their work, but
also  explained  how  they  brought  cases  in  states  with  generous
attorney fees and intentionally tailored claims to negate the brunt
of the Court’s decisions.
34 Moreover, the lawyers were not inclined
to  push  the  limits  of  class  action  procedures  to  bring  together
diverse categories of people with disabilities, as commentators have
championed.
35 Rather, the disability cause lawyers used the class
action device when it was expedient to achieve results on a dis-
ability-by-disability basis.
36 Thus, even as the ADA and other civil
rights statutes fared poorly in the Supreme Court and the resulting
decisions were identified by academics as preventing societal trans-
formation,
37 disability cause lawyers achieved significant progress
for their clients. As such, the disability cause lawyers incrementally
manifest part of the movement’s long-held desire of social integra-
tion—the “right to live in the world.”
38 Until now, this story has
been overlooked amidst the academic assault on the Court’s ADA
decisions. 
31. See infra text accompanying note 325.
32. See infra text accompanying note 326.
33. See, e.g., Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on Civil
Rights: The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L.
REV. 1087, 1090-92 (2007).
34. See infra notes 67-75 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 320-21 and accompanying text.
38. See Jacobus tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of
Torts, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 841, 852 (1966).1296 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1287
The Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I explains our methodol-
ogy  for  selecting  and  interviewing  disability  cause  lawyers  and
presents an extended review of the results of those discussions. This
data set is a rich compilation of the self-perceived successes and
failures  of  a  diverse  group  of  lawyers  that  provides  a  unique
snapshot of what the struggle to enforce and implement American
disability law looks like on the ground. Part II situates the disability
cause lawyers within the broader cause lawyering scholarship and
compares the methodology, goals, and self-imposed ethics among
modern social movement lawyers. Finally, Part III applies the sub-
stance of our interviews to disability civil rights scholarship. The
day-to-day work of disability cause lawyers confirms some of the
academic scholarship regarding the impact of the Supreme Court’s
narrow ADA and civil rights jurisprudence. The interviews, how-
ever,  also  challenge  much  established  wisdom  by  revealing  the
overlooked  story  of  how  these  lawyers  successfully  bring  about
social transformation for Americans with disabilities despite the
decisions of the Supreme Court. 
I. DISABILITY CAUSE LAWYER INTERVIEWS
There  are  many  different  ways  to  define  “cause  lawyer.”
39
Consistent with our prior research, we focused on lawyers who pri-
marily engaged in litigation on behalf of people with disabilities, as
opposed  to  lawyers  whose  main  efforts  were  on  other  types  of
advocacy.
40 Accordingly, we started with the evolving Disability
39. See SOUTHWORTH, supra note 10, at 5; see also William B. Rubenstein, Divided We
Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns,
106 YALE L.J. 1623, 1632-33 (1997) (using “professional public interest litigators” and private
“pro bono attorney” as terms to describe civil rights lawyers pursuing these types of cases).
See  generally  Scott  Barclay  &  Anna-Maria  Marshall,  Supporting  a  Cause,  Developing  a
Movement, and Consolidating a Practice: Cause Lawyers and Sexual Orientation Litigation
in  Vermont,  in  THE  WORLDS  CAUSE  LAWYERS  MAKE:  STRUCTURE  AND  AGENCY  IN  LEGAL
PRACTICE 171, 174 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2005) (“The definition of cause
lawyering is broad, encompassing a variety of tactics and strategies and emphasizing the
transformative goals and motivations of the attorneys engaged in the work.”).
40. See Stein et al., supra note 4, at 1661 (“[W]e mean attorneys who spend a significant
amount of their professional time designing and bringing cases that seek to benefit various
categories of people with disabilities and who have formal connections with disability rights
organizations.”).  This  choice  may  exclude  some  lawyers  who  could  be  considered  cause
lawyers. 2012] DISABILITY CAUSE LAWYERS 1297
Rights Bar Association (DRBA).
41 The DRBA originated with “a
group of disability counsel, law professors, legal nonprofits and ad-
vocacy groups who share a commitment to effective legal represen-
tation of individuals with disabilities.”
42 It describes itself as an
online community of lawyers “who specialize in disability civil rights
law” and facilitate the pursuit of stronger cases through information
and strategy exchange, mentorship, and coordination efforts.
43 One
of the stated values of the organization is that “[l]itigation and other
legal advocacy strategies play a highly effective and necessary role
in enforcing and advancing the rights of people with disabilities,”
and one of its objectives is to “advance and enforce the rights of
people with disabilities in all spheres of life through the use of
litigation and other legal advocacy strategies.”
44 
We requested and received permission to contact members of the
Executive Committee to see if they would interview for this project,
but excluded several members of the Executive Committee who
were not actively engaged in litigation. Using convenience sampling,
we conducted semi-structured interviews of Executive Committee
members in selected cities. We also interviewed several additional
lawyers who were repeatedly recommended by the lawyers we first
interviewed. This ultimately led to the interview of thirteen law-
yers. Twelve were done in face-to-face interviews, and one was done
via  videoconferencing  using  the  Internet-based  program  Skype.
Each interview lasted between forty-five and ninety minutes, during
which  we  asked  questions  about  the  following:  their  respective
backgrounds; their current office and organization; the economic
model on which such entities were based; the nature of the cases
typically brought; their motivations for bringing cases; their views
on and involvement with ADA employment litigation; what goals
they sought subsequent to litigation and how they hoped to achieve
41. See DISABILITY RIGHTS BAR ASSOCIATION, http://disabilityrights-law.org (last visited
Feb. 24, 2012). This organization was formerly called the Association of Disability Rights
Counsel. Id. Professor Waterstone is a member of the DRBA.
42. Id.
43. Id. DRBA membership is limited to nonprofit organizations and private law firms and
their  lawyers  who  represent  or  advise  persons  with  disabilities,  individual  attorneys
representing persons with disabilities, and law school professors who teach or study disability
rights law. Id. Members must certify that at least 90 percent of their disability-related work
is on behalf of people with disabilities. Id.
44. Id.1298 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1287
those goals; their views on constitutional disability litigation and
the Supreme Court; their views of the role of litigation in the dis-
ability movement; the use of media in their work; and finally, their
connections with other disability cause lawyers and lawyers for
other social movements. 
Our interviewing methodology yielded access to lawyers in pri-
vate law firms, lawyers affiliated with public interest organizations,
and lawyers connected to different disability communities (including
the  Deaf,  visually  impaired,  those  with  mental  disabilities  and
psycho-social disabilities, and the mobility impaired), with some
geographic diversity.
45 Still, as an initial survey, the cohort inter-
viewed lacked several representative factors. Because we targeted
locations with multiple interviewees, certain geographic areas are
absent. We also did not interview public enforcement officials at
either the state (e.g., California’s Department of Fair Employment
and  Housing)  or  federal  (e.g.,  Department  of  Justice)  levels.
Although  much  of  their  work  is  significant,  these  officials  fall
outside our working definition of cause lawyers. We did, however,
interview a high-level attorney in the National Disability Rights
Network, the largest nonprofit membership organization for the
Protection and Advocacy (P&A) network,
46 in order to obtain back-
ground information on the organization and its connections and
relationships with disability cause lawyers.
47 Finally, a significant
cohort of lawyers referred to as “high volume lawyers,” or more deri-
sively as “serial litigators” or “drive-by lawyers,” consider them-
selves disability cause lawyers.
48 These lawyers were excluded from
our interviews because of the nature of the network through which
45. We interviewed lawyers in California, Colorado, Maryland, and Washington, D.C. 
46. See About NDRN, NAT’L DISABILITY RTS. NETWORK, http://www.ndrn.org/en/about/
about-ndrn.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2012).
47. Interview with Lawyer 12 (Feb. 18, 2011).
48. See Stein et al., supra note 4, at 1681 n.72. Typically, these lawyers bring access
lawsuits against businesses, filing multiple lawsuits at once, pursuing early settlements,
representing the same clients as lead plaintiffs, and initiating their claims with a demand
letter to the challenged business. Id. These lawyers are controversial for bringing a high
volume of cases under the ADA’s public accommodations provisions or comparable state law
and seeking quick settlements. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Perversity of Limited Civil
Rights Remedies: The Case of “Abusive” ADA Litigation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2-5 (2006). 2012] DISABILITY CAUSE LAWYERS 1299
we chose to construct our sample, and not from any negative value
judgment ascribed to their work.
49 
A. Backgrounds 
Most lawyers we interviewed had either some significant con-
nection with disability or life experience with it. Eight cause lawyers
interviewed identified themselves as lawyers with disabilities and
another was married to a lawyer with a disability.
50 Nearly every
lawyer identified their work in this area as being based in some
form of a commitment to social justice.
51 Several had backgrounds
in other types of civil rights work, like unions, Title VII employment
discrimination on behalf of women and minorities, and the rights of
low wage workers.
52 Almost uniformly, these lawyers came from
elite backgrounds, with most graduating from what are universally
considered top-ranked national law schools.
53 Several clerked for
federal  judges  after  law  school,  held  government  positions,  or
worked at elite law firms.
54
B. Type of Office and Financing 
The lawyers who were interviewed worked in several different
types  of  settings.  Some  lawyers  moved  between  public  interest
49. Indeed, we have previously opined as to the value of this type of litigation, if not the
approval  of  the  tactics  these  lawyers  use.  See  Stein  et  al.,  supra  note  4,  at  1681  n.72
(acknowledging that “these lawyers provide a valuable public service”).
50. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 7 (Dec. 21, 2010); Interview with Lawyer 8 (Dec. 21,
2010).
51. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 2 (Oct. 10, 2010) (“We started [the law firm with] the
idea of a firm that could do good and do well at the same time.”); Interview with Lawyer 5
(Dec. 17, 2010) (referring to work as a “human issue” that is “so important”); Interview with
Lawyer 9 (Feb. 18, 2011) (“[Our mission is] about equality and people with disabilities,
particularly serious mental disabilities or clients of the public mental health system ... having
the opportunity to live as much as possible like people without disabilities.”). 
52. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 3 and Lawyer 4 (Dec. 17, 2010) (detailing Lawyer 3’s
prior  work  involvement  with  union  and  civil  rights  matters  and  Lawyer  4’s  previous
engagement with Title VII litigation).
53. These  include  Boalt  Hall  (Berkeley),  Cornell,  Harvard,  Hastings,  Georgetown,
University of Texas, Northwestern, and Yale. 
54. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 25; Interview with Lawyer 2, supra note
51; Interview with Lawyer 7, supra note 50.1300 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1287
firms, private law firms, and government, and could thus comment
about both present and past positions.
55 At the time of the inter-
views, five of the lawyers were at private law firms,
56 six were at
public  interest  law  firms,
57  and  two  were  in  government  and
academia.
58 For the lawyers in private law firms, disability rights
cases ranged from being over half of their caseload to the vast
majority of their practice.
59 These were all small law firms, ranging
from one- or two-person law firms to fourteen- or fifteen-person
firms.
60 None of these lawyers viewed themselves as doing this work
primarily pro bono.
61 Although a minority of disability rights cases
yielded damage judgments,
62 attorneys’ fees were the primary way
that they generated payment for their cases.
63 The one exception
55. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 25; Interview with Lawyer 8, supra note
50; Interview with Lawyer 13, supra note 1.
56. Interview with Lawyer 2, supra note 51; Interview with Lawyer 3 and Lawyer 4, supra
note 52 (both Lawyer 3 and Lawyer 4); Interview with Lawyer 7, supra note 50; Interview
with Lawyer 8, supra note 50.
57. Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 25; Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 51;
Interview with Lawyer 6 (Dec. 17, 2010); Interview with Lawyer 11 (Feb. 18, 2011); Interview
with Lawyer 12, supra note 47; Interview with Lawyer 13, supra note 1.
58. Interview with Lawyer 9, supra note 51; Interview with Lawyer 10 (Feb. 18, 2011).
59. See,  e.g.,  Interview  with  Lawyer  7,  supra  note  50  (“The  concept  from  the  very
beginning was to .... focus on Title 2, Title 3 Rehab Act and Fair Housing Act. And that has
been what we’ve done.”); Interview with Lawyer 8, supra note 50 (“I’m almost exclusively a
disability rights attorney.”).
60. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 3 and Lawyer 4, supra note 52 (Lawyer 3 is a solo
practitioner); Interview with Lawyer 7, supra note 50 (a two-partner firm).
61. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 3 and Lawyer 4, supra note 52 (detailing Lawyer 4’s
agreement that cases are not a pro bono endeavor and noting that “we do get paid for the
work we do”). 
62. See Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 25 (asserting that the ADA usually fails to
provide for damages); Interview with Lawyer 6, supra note 57 (reflecting that most cases do
not go to trial for a judgment to be rendered); Interview with Lawyer 11, supra note 57
(“[E]verybody knows that Title III of the ADA doesn’t allow for damages.”). But several of the
lawyers we interviewed were involved in National Federation of the Blind v. Target Corp., 582
F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1209 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (denying Target’s motion for summary judgment), and
452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 966 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (granting part of Target’s motion to dismiss but
denying the remainder of it). See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 13, supra note 1. This case
challenged the accessibility of Target Corporation’s website. 582 F. Supp. 2d at 1188-89. It
ultimately settled for six million dollars. Target Settles Web Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2008,
at C8.
63. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 3 and Lawyer 4, supra note 52 (statement of Lawyer
3) (“[W]e only have to take cases that ... would be entitled to fees ... under fee shifting statutes
because neither our organizations nor our individuals pay us.”); id. (statement of Lawyer 4)
(“[W]e select cases based on the ability to be successful. We choose cases that we think will2012] DISABILITY CAUSE LAWYERS 1301
was private lawyers who did work for the NFB, which pays its
lawyers by the hour.
64 Lawyers who worked for the NFB noted that
it paid by the hour to ensure that it received top-level legal service,
65
and other lawyers who did not work for the NFB spoke with admi-
ration  about  its  litigation  organization  and  resources.
66  For  the
private lawyers, all believed that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department
of Health & Human Resources—which reversed the catalyst theory
of recovering attorneys’ fees and replaced it with the requirement
that a prevailing party achieve an in-court resolution of the dispute
to recover attorneys’ fees
67—had dramatically impacted their ability
to receive payment for cases.
68 
These private lawyers talked about how Buckhannon led them to
bring cases in jurisdictions like California and Massachusetts where
they could include state law claims for damages.
69 Despite noting
that many of their cases were prime candidates for not receiving
ultimately have a result for our clients ... [and where they are] entitled to attorneys’ fees.”);
Interview with Lawyer 7, supra note 50 (“[We operate] entirely [on] attorneys’ fees.”).
64. Interview with Lawyer 3 and Lawyer 4, supra note 52 (statement of Lawyer 3) (“It’s
very different ... NFB pays by the hour.”).
65. One lawyer explained that when first asked to work on an NFB case: 
I told them I was so excited about getting this work that I wanted to discount my
hourly rate, not realizing there was a long history of the blind and other people
with disabilities getting second rate services as charity. And Dr. [Jernigan] ...
was still alive then and said, “[W]e have been dealing with lawyers for nearly 50
years. We long ago concluded that lawyers pay the most attention to that on
their desk which pays the best. If you were to represent us, we want your
undivided attention, am I clear?”
Interview with Lawyer 2, supra note 51. 
66. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 7, supra note 50 (“[W]e literally will sit around [green
with envy at] the infrastructure that the NFB has.”).
67. 532 U.S. 598, 604-05 (2001). 
68. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 2, supra note 51 (“[W]e take it as a given that when
we do a civil rights case in Maryland we’re going to lose money. We’re going to be pressured
to settle.”); Interview with Lawyer 7, supra note 50 (stating that “[Buckhannon] took a big bite
out of our business plan” and noting that before Buckhannon, the lawyer figured she could get
paid under the catalyst theory). 
69. See Interview with Lawyer 7, supra note 50 (“[Buckhannon] pushed us to strengthen
the California practice.”); Interview with Lawyer 8, supra note 50 (“[W]e find ourselves with
the federation cases in particular, we find ourselves going to California a lot where ... if we
employ state law we don’t have to worry about [Buckhannon].”); Interview with Lawyer 13,
supra note 1 (“[P]articularly [in] California [Buckhannon] is not as big of a ... concern because
California state law has a fee recovery provision that still contains a catalyst fee recovery.”). 1302 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1287
attorneys’ fees under Buckhannon,
70 because they often litigated
under Title III of the ADA where only injunctive relief was avail-
able,
71 these lawyers developed strategies to blunt its effect. These
strategies included bringing cases with broad requests for injunctive
relief because they believed, under Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.,
72 a high mootness bur-
den existed.
73 They also required defendants to sign a letter waiving
Buckhannon  before  engaging  in  negotiations  to  remedy  alleged
access  violations.
74  Finally,  some  of  the  lawyers  performed  less
traditional legal work, such as drafting policy positions on proposed
regulations and filing amicus briefs, on a pro bono basis subsidized
by their firms.
75
Other lawyers worked in public interest law firms or policy think
tanks. These ranged from cross-disability organizations that repre-
sented people with different types of disabilities,
76 organizations
that represented primarily individuals and groups with one type of
disability,
77 and broad public interest organizations that had one
disability practice area within their broader portfolio.
78 These enti-
ties had different backgrounds and histories.
79 They all relied to
70. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 7, supra note 50 (“[Buckhannon] took a big bite out
of our business plan.”); see also Interview with Lawyer 13, supra note 1 (“[Buckhannon] has
impacted ... every area of civil rights.”).
71. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 7, supra note 50 (describing litigation under Title III
of the ADA as a “perfect storm” for Buckhannon issues). 
72. See 528 U.S. 167, 189-94 (2000).
73. See Interview with Lawyer 7, supra note 50 (“[S]hort of things that are concrete in the
literal and figurative sense, almost anything comes undone.”). 
74. Interview with Lawyer 3 and Lawyer 4, supra note 52 (statement of Lawyer 3) (“[The
letter  we  require  defendants  to  sign  to  engage  in  negotiations]  waives  [Buckhannon]
specifically, expressly. Because otherwise—and we could say otherwise—we could have a
great agreement, but at the end of the day you could say ‘you’re out of luck, you didn’t have
a binding judgment order.’”). 
75. See id. (discussing unpaid work on Justice Department regulations and amicus briefs);
see also Interview with Lawyer 7, supra note 50 (discussing work on an amicus brief in a
Ninth Circuit disability access case). 
76. E.g., Interview with Lawyer 12, supra note 47.
77. E.g., Interview with Lawyer 11, supra note 57.
78. E.g., Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 51.
79. One was purposefully set up to be the “National Defense Fund” for disability rights,
consciously trying to “piggy back on the movements of minorities and women.” Interview with
Lawyer 6, supra note 57. At the time the group was started, this move was viewed as a “whole
change in culture to go from ... a name of a disease basically at the top of your letterhead to
a name that’s very obviously continued in a civil rights tradition.” Id. Describing this creation,2012] DISABILITY CAUSE LAWYERS 1303
varying extents on fundraising to support their work, which in-
cluded donations from big law firms, cy pres contributions, and state
and federal grants.
80 Several lawyers noted how fundraising had
become  more  difficult  in  the  current  economic  downturn.
81 T o
varying degrees, they also relied on attorneys’ fees to fund some of
their litigation activity.
82 Some identified Buckhannon as an issue
that adversely impacted their practices;
83 others felt it made less of
an impact.
84 These lawyers generally appeared less tied to attorneys’
this lawyer stated: 
[W]e were very aware of the fact that we wanted to be in that tradition. And we
convened a meeting in 1980 of the top cause lawyers in the country basically to
come to San Francisco where we introduced them to disability rights as a civil
rights issue and we wanted to learn from them.
Id. Another organization that has a disability rights component to its practice was initially
set up as a traditional legal aid society, doing traditional legal services for poor people.
Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 51. Eventually the decision was made to opt out of
federal funds and to become more of a specialty group with a commitment to workers’ rights,
with program areas in different areas including disability rights. Id. Another organization
was an academic think tank focusing on disability rights issues that was connected to a
university. Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 25. Its origins were as a social science
research institute, with the goal of using research to support advocacy in the areas of costs
of accommodations, vocational rehabilitation, and the implementation of disability rights. Id.
80. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 51 (“We have historic donors from the
big law firms.... We solicit outside contributions, we do some grant writing.”); Interview with
Lawyer 6, supra note 57 (emphasizing focus on state and federal grants).
81. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 6, supra note 57 (“[F]unding [is] always a struggle.”).
82. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 51 (“We consider attorneys’ fees ... and
once we have cases filed we absolutely keep our eye on the attorneys’ fees as an important
way to sustain the work.”); Interview with Lawyer 6, supra note 57 (agreeing that attorneys’
fees “very much” figure into funding); see also Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 25 (“I do
think [Buckhannon] is a big issue. I do think that the treatment of attorneys who do this work
as the private attorneys general is very important [and] that needs to be support[ed]. And
particularly since the ADA for the most part doesn’t provide for damages. Somebody needs
to pay professionals to do this job, and the federal government’s not going to be able to do it
all.”). 
83. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 6, supra note 57 (“[Buckhannon] does dictate a lot of
what we will and will not do.”); Interview with Lawyer 9, supra note 51 (“[We] sort of have to
not count on getting fees.... [T]he environment for winning cases and then the environment
around fees is so bad that we always kind of treat fees as a windfall.”). 
84. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 11, supra note 57 (“[Buckhannon has not been an
issue] for us.... [T]here are some ways of getting around [Buckhannon].... The first way is to
put in a damage claim. And, seemingly to me, lots of places get federal financial assistance....
So we bring a Rehab Act claim.”); Interview with Lawyer 13, supra note 1 (explaining that
Buckhannon has not had as much of a direct impact on his practice, especially compared to
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fees than their private counterparts.
85 They felt that their cases
involved  large  enough  requests  for  injunctive  relief  that  it  was
practically impossible for defendants to completely moot out their
claims.
86 These lawyers also generally had more freedom to work on
other legal advocacy, including policy research, regulatory work, and
amicus briefs.
87
C. Relationships with Clients and the Disability Rights        
Community
Although the relationships between the lawyers and their clients
varied, there were also some significant commonalities. Nearly all
these lawyers, public and private, viewed themselves as lawyers for
the entirety of, or at least various segments of, the disability com-
munity.
88 They generally had significant relationships with these
communities that transcended  any individual case, because the
85. See Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 51 (“We try not to let [attorneys’ fees] drive
the case selection.... [I]n general these big institutions aren’t able to reform their systems in
time. So we end up not having a [Buckhannon] problem.”); see also Interview with Lawyer 1,
supra note 25 (“Here we don’t do much straight litigation, so it’s not attorneys’-fee funded. So
I don’t think very much about [Buckhannon] now.”); Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 51
(agreeing that in employment cases, damage claims can be brought, so Buckhannon is not an
issue); Interview with Lawyer 6, supra note 57 (“[W]e put in our retainer agreement now ...
that our clients won’t waive our fees.”).
86. See Interview with Lawyer 9, supra note 51 (“I suspect it’s rare that you have a big
investment in a case ... [where] there’s been a lot of litigation that goes on and then the
government just says ‘oh, you win’ [rather than settling].”). 
87. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 25 (organizing Disability Rights Bar
Association and working on policy briefs); Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 51 (doing
legislative work); Interview with Lawyer 6, supra note 57 (working on legislative issues).
88. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 51 (“I think it’s important to try to—I
don’t know if the word listen is right but to try and pay attention to what people [in] the
community want, not just what the lawyers want. I go to—I also go to lawyer events but I will
also go to disability community events.”); Interview with Lawyer 6, supra note 57 (noting that
in the early days of the organization, a nonlawyer with deep connections to the disability
community, who “was very much of the movement” and knew “how it is to try to get a doctor’s
appointment and [solve] access issues” was the one who did all the community trainings and
helped build a transformational moment when the disability community took ownership of
the  law);  Interview  with  Lawyer  7,  supra  note  50  (describing  a  significant  and  close
relationship with the state disability rights group, and remarking that “when we came to [our
current city], we met up and then started working with the folks at the [state disability rights
group].... [W]e love working with them, they’re awesome clients, they’re some of our best
friends.... And we knew that we would have a very powerful ally that ... wanted to go out and
enforce the law through litigation.”). 2012] DISABILITY CAUSE LAWYERS 1305
lawyers were themselves people with disabilities, had close family
members with disabilities, or maintained their  most significant
professional  relationships  with  disability  rights  organizations.
89
These lawyers reflected on how they used these relationships to
gauge community need and direction for the types of cases that
should be brought.
90 Several lawyers went even further in their
articulation  of  how  they  viewed  themselves  as  being  driven  by
community need: they explained that their clients in the disability
community were very clear about why they wanted to bring liti-
gation and what they wanted to accomplish, and they viewed their
role as providing the legal skills and work needed to accomplish
those goals through litigation.
91 At least one lawyer took the view
that there was some disconnect between disability rights litigators
and their principals in the various disability rights organizations.
92
It was clear that different lawyers primarily served, and had
connections with, discrete populations of people with disabilities.
Some lawyers brought cases primarily on behalf of individuals with
89. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
90. See Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 51 (“[In our workers’ rights clinic] we serve
thousands in a limited way, with advising counsel. So because of that ... it’s almost like we
have all this data about this group of several thousand low-wage workers [that] are coming
[through] the door every year. And from that we have an understanding of—at least from that
population—what the needs are.”); see also Interview with Lawyer 3 and Lawyer 4, supra note
52 (statement of Lawyer 4) (“Well everything is client driven, we don’t think of an issue and
then just decide to do a case about it. We really consider ourselves the lawyers for [various
organizations of individuals who are blind].... And people tell us what sort of problems they’re
having and then that’s how we select our cases.”); Interview with Lawyer 6, supra note 57
(“Sometimes it’s like someone actually comes and alerts us on an issue that we go ‘Whoa that’s
quite an issue,’ and other times it’s areas that we know; it’s kind of buzzing in the community
that there is no access but no one is doing anything about it.”); Interview with Lawyer 1,
supra note 25 (“[I]t’s right to [respond to client needs] because that is the community’s
expression of what is important.”).
91. See Interview with Lawyer 2, supra note 51 (“I am strictly the chauffeur. [My client]
decides what it wants to focus on and the character of the result right down to [whether you]
define accessibility in terms of some kind of objectives—kind of like what category are you
going to do—[such as] a functional standard, like all information and transactions available
to sighted people must be available to the blind person with a substantially equal ease of use.
So in this respect, I am very much like any private practice work with clients because [my
client] is deciding.... [M]ake no mistake about it, I’m never the decision maker—it’s [my client]
that’s making the decisions.”).
92. See Interview with Lawyer 10, supra note 58 (“I just ... felt like there was a division
between the lawyers that were litigators and saw themselves as litigators and the kind of
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mobility impairments. Others litigated primarily on behalf of blind
individuals. Even within these communities, there was a split be-
tween lawyers who primarily served the NFB and lawyers who
served the ACB and state affiliates.
93 There were some examples of
cross-advocacy by lawyers who generally served one community or
another, but some lawyers felt they represented the interests of one
community of people with disabilities because they understood these
issues best.
94 Other lawyers had a more consistent cross-disability
practice and served various communities.
95 Some lawyers spoke
longingly of a more unified disability community but felt it was
difficult given the very diverse nature of the larger movement.
96
D. Cases and Litigation Strategy
The lawyers who were interviewed brought cases under different
disability rights laws. These included section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion  Act;
97  Titles  I,  II,  and  III  of  the  ADA;
98 t h e  F a i r  H o u s i n g
Amendments  Act;
99  the  Individuals  with  Disabilities  Education
93. See Interview with Lawyer 3 and Lawyer 4, supra note 52 (statement of Lawyer 3)
(“[W]e don’t do any cases with NFB because there [are] organizational differences ... but I
think we would say that we try very hard to have a really good relationship with [NFB
lawyers] because we all agree that there is plenty of work to go around and it doesn’t help
anyone for there to be any internal competition.”); see also Interview with Lawyer 8, supra
note 50 (wishing to ensure that “when the ACB is involved or something, that we were acting
enough in the coordinating fashion that we’re not hurting the overall state of the law”). 
94. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 3 and Lawyer 4, supra note 52 (statement of Lawyer
3) (“I think ... that there’s really a lot of issues around blindness and to do it right, I wouldn’t
touch an issue around deafness or hearing impairment .... We know what’s involved in doing
a good job for blind people so we know what we don’t know in these other fields.”).
95. Lawyers also noted that some issue areas, like employment and technology, have
issues  that  transcend  individual  disabilities. See,  e.g.,  id.  (“Well  I  think  the  technology
connection is cross over. I think we are seen as leaders because of our work that we have done
in the disability technology field which is ... large for blindness but also involves deafness ...
at least with the experts.”).
96. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 7, supra note 50 (“[It] is a very diverse movement and
for whatever reason one part of it has gotten very organized around the NFB, but I think if
you sat down and told, ADAPT ... and Californians for Disability Rights and [the Colorado
Cross Disability Coalition] and United Spinal and [said]: ‘Okay, everybody is going to get
together under one banner and ... this is going to be our litigation strategy’ there will be just
[uproarious] laughter.”).
97. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006).
98. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
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Act;
100 state disability rights laws;
101 and others.
102 In terms of the
issue areas of cases, although different lawyers had different prac-
tices, it is possible to note some generalities. The largest pocket of
concentration was on various forms of access litigation under Titles
II and III of the ADA. In this area, some groups—particularly the
NFB—purposefully targeted access to technology for individuals
who are blind.
103 Similarly, some lawyers focused on making the
financial services industry—including ATMs and other point-of-sale
machines—accessible to blind individuals.
104 Other lawyers worked
to make state and local governments and privately-owned places of
accommodation accessible for individuals who use wheelchairs in
terms of both physical infrastructure and those entities’ programs
and policies.
105 
Other groups  worked  on  cases  involving  community integra-
tion, implementing and extending the Supreme Court’s decision in
Olmstead v. L.C.
106 Case selection of some lawyers was driven by the
100. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1419.
101. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 52(a), 54.3 (West 2006).
102. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93, § 103 (2006). These include, among others, the Randolph-
Sheppard Act, 20 U.S.C. § 107, and the Air Carrier Access Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41705.
103. See Interview with Lawyer 2, supra note 51 (“[A] very good example of that is that in
the late ‘90s ... Marc [Maurer the president of the NFB] ... sat down with me and he said,
‘Look, technology should be incredibly liberating [for] the disability community and instead
because ... designers of technology aren’t thinking about access, we’re actually being more
isolated than we were.’ And I asked him to explain and he said, ‘[when we] buy a new house
today  the  [stove]  was  inaccessible,  the  washer  and  dryer  ...  and  the  thermostat  are
inaccessible because all the dials are gone and things I used to be able to do for myself
independently I can’t do anymore.’ And he said, ‘I want you to design a campaign to get the
attention of technology developers.’”); see also Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 25 (“Right
now, I’ve been working mostly on technology cases, websites, e-book readers, other forms of
educational technology and other more general technology to get accessibility built into the
mainstream.... [T]his is such a huge opportunity for people with print disabilities, not just
blind but hearing disabilities and learning disabilities and intellectual disabilities and all
these things. It’s a huge opportunity, but if we don’t start to do it every day the way we do
other things ... you’ve got a brand new thing that doesn’t work and people will be further
behind than they were. So everybody else will get their information off of Google and blind
people have to find a paper book and have it ... turned into a disc-readable version. And so it’s
an opportunity and a huge risk and that’s why I’m interested in that.”). 
104. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 3 and Lawyer 4, supra note 52 (statement of Lawyer
4) (“Our goals [in targeting financial services industries] are for people with visual impair-
ments and other people with disabilities to have independence and live decent lives.”).
105. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 7, supra note 50 (“[T]he goal is to get these companies
to both change their physical plant and change [the way] they do business.”). 
106. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 587, 607 (1999) (holding that Title II1308 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1287
missions of their organizations; in other instances, lawyers were
driven by path dependence—they originally worked on one type of
case, achieved success and became known for it, and then duplicated
that type of case multiple times.
107 
When polled about why they bring specific cases, the lawyers
were uniformly uninterested in using the courts to dramatically
change the landscape of disability law. Rather, the most common
answer was some variation of litigating to “make a point.”
108 These
lawyers were most interested in bringing cases that changed not
only the behavior of the given defendant in the case, but also that
of other similarly situated defendants who were not parties to the
lawsuit. One lawyer stated: 
[I am] looking for the industry change case ... [Y]ou look for the
case that will change a lot of behavior besides just the behavior
of the individual [defendant]. Because we simply don’t have the
resources to address one by one ... you do selective enforcement
to change the behavior of many.
109
 
This same lawyer, explaining attempts to change behavior through
litigation, explained that with technology cases, the goal was to
change the law enough to make additional defendants feel that they
of the ADA includes a preference for individuals to be put in community-based treatment
programs instead of institutions); see Interview with Lawyer 9, supra note 51 (“[Our] mission
really is about community integration.”). 
107. See Interview with Lawyer 3 and Lawyer 4, supra note 52 (statement of Lawyer 4)
(“After we had a few talking ATM agreements we started getting complaints from people with
visual impairments, members of these affiliated ACB organizations, that were saying, ‘You
know I used to be able to check out at the grocery store and use my ATM card on a tactile
keypad[, but] the grocery store recently swapped out those machines for flat screen machines
[and now] I can’t check out at the grocery store and use the ATM card without giving the clerk
my pin, so can we do something about that.’ So that generated another twelve cases.”); see also
Interview with Lawyer 7, supra note 50 (discussing how initial litigation against a national
company in one city led to similar cases in a different state). 
108. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 25 (“[M]ostly for me I want to win, I
want to get the issue resolved and I want to get it settled and that can be at the local level,
it can be at the state level, it can be at the trial level, it can be at the appellate level. Mostly
when I go about doing something it’s not about making law, it’s about making a point.”). 
109. Interview with Lawyer 2, supra note 51. This lawyer referenced litigation against a
large retailer that had concluded with the court ruling that the retailer’s online website
needed to be accessible to consumers who are blind. The lawyer noted that in a study of the
top ten e-tailing sites, one-third of the sites were more accessible six months after the lawsuit
than the day the suit was filed. Id.2012] DISABILITY CAUSE LAWYERS 1309
could be liable for certain behaviors.
110 This sentiment, although
expressed differently, was shared by many of the lawyers.
111 The
largest exception to this “make a point” vision included cases that
were brought purely to counter a position, generally taken by a state
agency, which infringed on an important right of someone with a
disability.
112
We also polled the lawyers on whether they viewed themselves as
trying to enforce existing law or make new law. Generally speaking,
these lawyers felt they were trying to do both and there was no
particular correlation between private and public interest lawyers.
There were no differences in how private or public interest lawyers
explained themselves. Most felt that the existing laws were good,
110. Id. 
111. See Interview with Lawyer 6, supra note 57 (“On litigation basically our aim is ... that
it has to be a case that is systemic in some way.”); see also Interview with Lawyer 3 and
Lawyer 4, supra note 52 (statement of Lawyer 3) (“[W]e changed the banking industry by
negotiating 19 agreements for talking ATMs, websites in Braille and large print and audio....
[N]ow the finance industry is the most accessible private industry.”); id. (statement of Lawyer
4) (“[W]e choose cases that we think will ultimately have a result for our clients that includes
injunctive type relief, you know some kind of systemic change with the company that we’re
approaching.”); Interview with Lawyer 7, supra note 50 (“[T]he goal is to get these companies
to both change their physical plant and change [the way] they do business.”); Interview with
Lawyer 8, supra note 50 (“[G]etting involved in litigation is a major investment. It takes a lot
of resources. So we want to bring cases that are high impact and will truly help change the
system.”); Interview with Lawyer 11, supra note 57 (“[W]e’re looking for cases that translate
to help [for] as many people as possible.”); Interview with Lawyer 13, supra note 1 (“[W]e want
to know that the work that we put into it if we’re successful is going to change society in a
fundamental way, and remove barriers to not just the main plaintiff, but to an entire class of
people with disabilities.”). 
112. See  Interview  with  Lawyer  1,  supra  note  25  (“[At  previous  disability  rights
organizations] we did things where we knew something bad was going to happen, the State
is going to cut back benefits or the county is going to close [a hospital that serves people who
have rehabilitation needs] and something had to be done about that.”); see also Interview with
Lawyer 2, supra note 51 (“[T]here is a whole other category of cases where you have no choice
but to do them, the case where some state agency thinks ‘[because a] new mother is blind, she
can’t possibly raise the child, [so] we are taking the child.’ And those [cases] you just do
because they are so fundamental that you have to do them and I think I’ve had maybe five of
those ‘take the child away cases,’ either involving mothers or grandmothers with custody.”);
Interview with Lawyer 8, supra note 50 (“[A] classic example ... is some of these custody cases
... [in which] a state agency tries to take a child away from a blind person because of alleged
concerns about safety ... or it comes up in custody [battles] where, let’s say a sighted father
will say, ‘No no no, I don’t want the child with the mom, she’s blind.’ So those are very
individual battles in some ways, but we get involved in those to help our members, but also
to make a point, of course.”).1310 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1287
although under-enforced.
113 From this, some lawyers viewed their
role as being law enforcers.
114 Other lawyers were not interested in
bringing  enforcement  actions  where  there  were  clear  statutory
violations,
115 preferring instead to focus on securing favorable in-
terpretations of existing law so that other lawyers benefit from
these interpretations.
116 Thus, some lawyers evinced an interest in
creating favorable ADA precedent, although nearly always tied to
specific relief for a client.
117 Others were expressly uninterested in
building up case law, noting a reluctance to engineer favorable legal
results through cases that might lose at the trial level but yield
favorable precedents in the appellate courts.
118 One lawyer flatly
113. See Interview with Lawyer 3 and Lawyer 4, supra note 52 (statement of Lawyer 4)
(“[W]e think the law is pretty good already.... And the courts are bad.”); see also Interview
with Lawyer 8, supra note 50 (“Oh yeah, absolutely [I believe the ADA is under-enforced]. I
don’t suppose it’s much different then what other civil rights lawyers found at first with, you
know, the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Just putting something on paper is ... good, it’s a starting
place, but it doesn’t do you any good until people really understand it and enforce it.”);
Interview with Lawyer 9, supra note 51 (“[E]xisting law—it’s not enforced very well.”). 
114. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 25 (“If I want to enforce the law ...
generally I want to enforce it at its broadest—that’s when I do litigation.”).
115. See Interview with Lawyer 9, supra note 51 (“[I]f you mean enforc[ing] existing law
in terms of ... [where there is] a pretty clear understanding of what existing law is, [and] let’s
just enforce it—no, we have no interest.”); see also Interview with Lawyer 11, supra note 57
(“[W]e like to litigate in areas that have not been litigated by others in the past. We’re looking
to get good case law out there as illustrations for others to kind of carry on.”). 
116. See Interview with Lawyer 9, supra note 51 (explaining the statutory interpretation
issues his organization sought to establish under the Olmstead decision and stating that “on
the question of whether people are capable of living outside the institution, does the state get
to make that decision first?... If the state has a process for making those determinations, what
degree of deference is due to it? If they don’t have such a system, can the judge make that
decision on his own in a trial?”). 
117. See Interview with Lawyer 7, supra note 50 (“[P]art of the challenge of Title [III] is
even now—15 years in, it‘s still kind of new. There’s still a lot of nooks and crannies that have
not been ruled on. So yes, we’d like to push it, but it’s sort of playing offense and defense at
the same time, we want to make sure it just comes out right.”); see also Interview with Lawyer
6, supra note 57 (“[S]ometimes we think we are bringing a case [setting] forth existing law
and then we find out once we are in the court that according to what the defendant says I
guess we are establishing new law  because they say there is no basis for what we are
saying.”); Interview with Lawyer 8, supra note 50 (“[T]hese direct threat cases are a perfect
example, you know, if an employer has a burden of proving that an employee with a disability
would be a direct threat to him or herself or others and you have to prove that through
objective means. Well that all sounds really good but, you know, we’ve worked hard to get
cases sort of interpreting that and making it clear that the employer really does have to
establish that burden. They just can’t say, ‘I’m afraid.’ Or, ‘I can think of some parade of
horribles where somebody can get hurt.’”). 
118. See Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 25 (“[M]ostly I don’t take cases to push the2012] DISABILITY CAUSE LAWYERS 1311
stated that her firm was not creating legal precedents; rather, the
firm was “[c]reating industry precedent. We care about results.”
119
This desire to “make a point” illuminated these lawyers’ choice of
class actions versus individual cases. Some lawyers generally did
significant class action work; others handled a blend of class and
individual cases. And while there was some discussion of the impor-
tance of cases to vindicate individual rights, the primary emphasis
was a preference for cases that make a larger point.
120 At times,
individual  cases  with  an  individual  plaintiff  looking  for  broad
injunctive relief, or even organizational or associational plaintiffs,
could accomplish this. When the class action vehicle was employed,
it  was  often  to  circumvent  standing  problems  with  individual
cases.
121 This seemed to be the primary driver of the use of class
actions; it was viewed less often as a vehicle for damage aggrega-
tion.
122 When these lawyers did bring class actions, their classes
law where I don’t believe it is right.”); see also Interview with Lawyer 3 and Lawyer 4, supra
note 52 (statement of Lawyer 4) (“It’s not just like, ‘Oh should we do a lawsuit and win and
get  great  [precedent],’  it’s  ‘Should  we  do  a  lawsuit  and  risk  getting  bad  [precedent].’”);
Interview with Lawyer 7, supra note 50 (“[W]e probably would not take on a case, for example,
with seriously bad facts and just sort of push just to try to test the law.”).
119. Interview with Lawyer 3 and Lawyer 4, supra note 52 (statement of Lawyer 3, echoing
a similar statement by Lawyer 4). Other lawyers made similar statements. When asked about
the goals of her work, one lawyer stated, “I feel like we have these laws and the goal is to
enforce the law, which is important in every issue area, but particularly with disability rights,
with the affirmative obligations that you really need lawyers to enforce often. But also to
make sure that we are not just enforcing, but sort of pushing just a little bit.” Interview with
Lawyer 5, supra note 51. 
120. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 2, supra note 51 (“It’s really the litigation strategy
that defines which way I’m looking for maximum impact. And sometimes the individual who
comes  may  not  be  susceptible  to  class  action.  And  so  it’s  done  as  an  individual  case.
Sometimes you can get broad relief with associational standing.”).
121. See Interview with Lawyer 7, supra note 50 (“[I]f someone presents us with a problem
that is wide enough spread, so that ... we’re going to have enough people to satisfy numerosity,
who also satisfy commonality, and where we think that a class-based solution is going to solve
the problem. And sometimes the problem is sufficiently simple that you can either have a
single plaintiff or an organizational plaintiff.... I think it’s really case by case ... the case like
a Taco Bell or Kmart really needs a class because if you have one person with one type of
disability come in, they can really only take on so much and potentially only for a store or
two.”); see also Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 25 (“I’ve done individual cases that have
done as much impact as in the class. It doesn’t have to be a class.”); Interview with Lawyer
5, supra note 51 (“I think it is important to get broad injunctive relief and to do ... classes, but
I really also think that individuals are important too.”).
122. One lawyer did note, however, that he “started to learn to use class actions more and
of course when we want the fear of damages to motivate an industry.” Interview with Lawyer
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were generally noncontroversial, at least in terms of the aggregation
of  people  with  disabilities.
123  There  was  little  indication  of  any
efforts—or desire—to test or push the limits of class certification
law by trying to certify classes of people with different types of
disabilities,  even  among  organizations  that  valued  their  cross-
disability focus.
124 
Of the lawyers interviewed, only a few worked regularly on Title
I employment discrimination cases. This was not because they were
viewed as unimportant. On the contrary, many of these lawyers
talked about the importance of employment to people with disabili-
ties and the belief that people were often discriminated against in
employment on the basis of disability.
125 As one attorney put it: “I
see [the] employment and disability community the way I look at
housing and racial justice. The great unfulfilled promise and the
hardest problem there is.”
126 The lawyers who regularly brought
Title I cases, while acknowledging that they were not class action
cases,  spoke  passionately  about  the  importance  of  this  work.
127
Lawyers also noted how an employment practice creates space to
123. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 51 (“[T]he only [class action cases] that
are really possible right now are probably deaf and hard [of] hearing [cases].”). 
124. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 13, supra note 1 (“[W]e are explicitly cross disability
in our focus. So, we try to address the needs of every part of the disability community. We
don’t always do it in the same case ... [because] it’s difficult to combine every disability group
in the single case and get it certified as a class action.”). 
125. See Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 25 (“I’m personally interested in why people
with disabilities [are] not employed and that’s about hiring. And you almost never can do ADA
enforcement at the hiring stage because you don’t know why you didn’t get hired.”); see also
Interview with Lawyer 6, supra note 57 (noting interest in doing more employment cases
based on the importance of employment); Interview with Lawyer 8, supra note 50 (“[T]here’s
still a lot of employment discrimination against blind people.”); Interview with Lawyer 13,
supra note 1 (“So, we know that [employment] is an issue that is critical; that somehow or
another we have to focus and make progress.”). 
126. Interview with Lawyer 2, supra note 51.
127. See Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 51 (“I just think it’s incredibly important ...
what people [with] disabilities really care about. People really want to work, more than
anything else they want to be in the workplace, they want to make a contribution, they want
to be included, they want equal opportunity to advance.... I have no doubt that my interest
in workplace issues will last my entire life.”); see also Interview with Lawyer 8, supra note 50
(“In our society we identify people with, ‘What do you do for a living?’ And we classify people
just with that simple question, and so for me, having access to the employment world is just
as important as, you know, access to websites, or wheelchair access to Taco Bells.”). 2012] DISABILITY CAUSE LAWYERS 1313
develop reasonable accommodation law, a revolutionary legal issue
with implications for other civil rights communities.
128
The interviewed lawyers offered several reasons for the lack of
employment litigation in their practices, ranging from an estab-
lished  plaintiffs’  employment  bar  taking  cases,
129  the  economic
challenges of doing this type of work,
130 and even the fact that these
cases were not a good personality fit for the lawyers.
131 The most
common  reason  these  lawyers  offered  for  not  bringing  Title  I
employment cases related to their desire to bring cases to make a
point.  Title  I  cases  were  viewed  as  individualized,  incapable  of
aggregation, and the most likely to generate bad law by hostile
courts.
132 As one lawyer explained:
128. See Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 51 (“I think reasonable accommodation is
very interesting, I think it’s potentially revolutionary.... [After the amendments to the ADA]
more and more people are covered, more and more changes can be made to accommodate
people so that the work place becomes more flexible. That’s good for everybody, I would love
for everybody to have reasonable accommodation [in] the workplace. I don’t think it should
be limited to people with disabilities.”). This lawyer also noted her view that many disability
cause lawyer colleagues do employment cases. Id. This insight led to additional interviews
with people this lawyer identified. 
129. See Interview with Lawyer 6, supra note 57 (“I think that employment is an area
where people with disabilities probably have the most representation because [the National
Employment Lawyers Association (NELA)] and a lot of private attorneys do employment.”);
see  also  Interview  with  Lawyer  7,  supra  note  50  (“That  area  [of  disability  employment
discrimination] is well covered, and we didn’t feel like we’d be adding something. We did feel
like we’d have a lot of really high-quality competition.”); Interview with Lawyer 8, supra note
50 (“I think what has happened is, the ... ADA cases dealing with employment have been
awful in terms of the Supreme Court litigation and other cases. So I think that’s deterred a
lot of people from taking them, and I think that’s been a problem.”).
130. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 2, supra note 51 (“[W]e have, for a variety of reasons,
eschewed doing employment cases, whether it’s disability discrimination or other forms of
discrimination,  because  of  the  economic  challenges  of  doing  individual  employment
discrimination cases.”).
131. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 7, supra note 50 (“[W]e would rather ... do the kind
of cases where you measure liability with a tape measure rather than the type where your
client breaks down in tears in your conference room.... [F]undamentally we’re math and arts
nerds with law degrees.”).
132. See Interview with Lawyer 3 and Lawyer 4, supra note 52 (statement of Lawyer 4)
(“[O]ur firm does class action litigation [in non-ADA cases] and I only know of one successful
class action ... under Title I, [and] I have the impression that it’s just much harder [to] find
a commonality to do a successful Title I class action ... [because] you would have to find an
employer that actually has an across-the-board policy and that’s going to be hard to find.”);
see also Interview with Lawyer 2, supra note 51 (“There are a couple of reasons [to not do
employment cases].... [F]irst of all it’s very hard to do something on a class basis.... [B]y and
large it’s hard to get a class, so it’s hard to have a piece of litigation that can have a broad
impact. Second, if you’re doing these cases, other than company employees, you’re going to1314 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1287
If you’re trying to make a point, you’re mostly not going to get
there [with employment cases because the easiest cases resolve
at the EEOC level.] 
... The harder cases are the ones that come out of the EEOC
unresolved that you take back and take to litigation, and ... they
always end up getting individualized, [because] it’s a reasonable
accommodation, it’s an individualized inquiry, [and] it’s very
hard to make a point in that arena, I think. And it’s very easy to
make a bad point.
133 
Another lawyer put it similarly: “[W]hen you’ve won [a disability
employment discrimination case], you may have won for that one
individual but you haven’t changed anything.”
134 There was frus-
tration about this, and at least one lawyer viewed failure-to-hire
testing as a universe of cases that should be brought.
135 But this
lawyer identified high barriers to this type of work and given the
time,  complexity,  and  resource  challenges,  felt  that  the  EEOC
should be doing it.
136
have a jury and you have to deal with the public perceptions of disability as being far more
limiting  than  they  truly  are.  And  that’s  a  challenge  you  don’t  have  in  the  public
accommodation cases and the Title II cases.”); Interview with Lawyer 6, supra note 57 (“It’s
not like we haven’t gone that direction [with Title I cases] ever, but generally we don’t because
it is often a fact-specific case.”). 
133. Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 25. This lawyer went on to explain:
[I]n the reasonable accommodation area [in employment] it’s hard to make law
because  it’s  also  individualized.  It’s  easy  to  make  bad  law  because  the
defendants are going after the summary judgment stage and so they’re trying
to make law and you’re trying to save your client. 
So there’s a disconnect there, the courts are going to look at the bad, easy way
to get out of the case.
Id.
134. Interview with Lawyer 2, supra note 51.
135. See Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 25 (“I’m personally interested in why people
with disabilities [are] not employed, and that’s about hiring. And you almost never can do
ADA enforcement at the hiring stage because you don’t know why you didn’t get hired. So you
don’t get to go back and say you didn’t hire me because I had a disability. Nobody told you
that, you have no basis for saying it. So in order for you to do that you have to do testing.”). 
136. See id. (“[Y]ou have to nail down every possible excuse that they could come up with
for why it’s not a disability reason. And so you have to do not just match pairs but ... [you have
to] video tape them during interviews. And you’ve got to get inside as much as you could
possibly and you’ve got to look at all the possibilities—that you can’t even think of ahead of
time—for why they’ll make an excuse that it really wasn’t a disability-related decision. So
testing, just the basic match pairs testing will give you a sort of ‘yes, people discriminate’
feeling, but that’s not enough to go forward with the case. So it’s just a lot of factors and you
have to do it a lot of different times. You can’t just do one matched pair, and you [have] to2012] DISABILITY CAUSE LAWYERS 1315
We also asked these lawyers about the mechanics of how they
hoped to achieve change as a result of their cases. Generally, these
lawyers expressed a desire for flexibility, of not being tied to one
particular vision of private settlements or consent decrees.
137 In
many cases, the lawyers were able to get the results they wanted
through settlement, although that happened at varying stages of the
litigation  process.
138  Several  lawyers  discussed  how  settlements
were almost always made public, either through their own or their
client’s policies.
139 As one lawyer explained: 
[A]ll of our settlements are public. So what we’re looking for is
to create precedent so with the next company, we may not even
file a suit, we may just talk to them and they start to say “Well
you know what we want is the definition of accessibility is XYZ,”
we can say, “No, here is what we’ve done ... here are the last 6
settlements we did in this area, and this is the standard.”
140 
There was a clear focus on post-dispute monitoring, which many
lawyers viewed as crucial to prevent backsliding. There was some
skepticism  of  courts  adequately  monitoring  such  agreements.
Lawyers thought about empowering companies to continually make
needed  changes  and  optimally to include some representation of
the disability community so as to ensure that difficult technical
keep track of it all and watch for every excuse and nail down at the front end of any excuse
they could be coming up with before you can take it forward.”).
137. See Interview with Lawyer 7, supra note 50 (“It depends on a lot of things, it depends
somewhat on the judge ... because some judges are very hostile to retaining jurisdiction, [and]
it depends on the defendant.”); see also Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 25 (“I think that’s
really case and defendant specific.”); Interview with Lawyer 2, supra note 51 (“[A settlement]
needs to work and we need to be able to get back into court[,] unless the lesson we need to
convey is you know, always ... be enjoined[,] we don’t necessarily need a court order.”).
138. Two lawyers interviewed typically negotiated complete settlements without resorting
to litigation, using their reputation in the community, track record, and negotiation skills to
convince companies to eschew the necessity of litigation to resolve the issue. See Interview
with Lawyer 3 and Lawyer 4, supra note 52.
139. See id. (statement of Lawyer 3) (explaining that she makes all settlements publicly
available on her firm’s website, although the settlements sometimes have a confidential
addendum). 
140. Interview with Lawyer 2, supra note 51; see also Interview with Lawyer 11, supra note
57 (“We got a declaratory judgment [saying] that what [one defendant athletic team] was
doing ... was violating Title III of the ADA. We used that and we filed a lawsuit against
[another athletic team.] And to [their] credit, after we filed it they read [the first settlement,
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issues were considered from a disability perspective.
141 Many law-
yers spoke of their desire to change the culture within companies
and organizations, and tried to tailor their litigation approaches to
accomplish  this  goal.  One  set  of  lawyers  never  used  the  word
“discriminate”  in  their  discussions  and  early  negotiations  with
defendants, preferring instead to focus on something internally in
the company that aligns with the disability-friendly values these
lawyers are promoting.
142 Another explained:
[W]e try to go about this in a way that will make them enthusi-
asts and converts and want to reach beyond [the minimum in
the law].
... [W]e may start in an adversarial position, but what we are
talking about here is social change and attitude change and if we
just sort of grind people into the dust, well settlement is not
going to last, change is not going to last, not with them individu-
ally ... but also we’re not helping to get that broader accept-
ance.
143
 
Several lawyers talked about how they viewed a particular result
as successful when a case led companies to work towards a more
disability-inclusive  and  forward-thinking  approach  to  disability
issues.
144  Although  damages  are  often  not  available  under  the
141. See Interview with Lawyer 2, supra note 51 (“[F]or example, with websites what we
are most concerned about is the ability to monitor but also giving the company the tools to
stay accessible.... Websites are very dynamic things and there are going to be people in the
company who are going to be putting in code every day, so I’m more focused on getting a good
set of guidelines and best practices and changing the culture in the company.”); see also
Interview with Lawyer 10, supra note 58 (“I feel like if you really want to change cultures and
bureaucracies in terms of how they interact with disability issues, the best way to do it is to
get disabled people into the bureaucracy.”).
142. See Interview with Lawyer 3 and Lawyer 4, supra note 52 (statement of Lawyer 3);
see also Interview with Lawyer 2, supra note 51 (“[What] we try to do is to make settlements
that are commercially reasonable so that when we do approach somebody with the threat of
a lawsuit they know that if they talk to us we will be working with them to come up with a
solution that’s a win for both [of] us.”); Interview with Lawyer 3 and Lawyer 4, supra note 52
(statement of Lawyer 3) (“We know you pride yourself on being the friendliest airlines in the
skies, [but] you forgot this part of your population.”). 
143. Interview with Lawyer 2, supra note 51. 
144. See Interview with Lawyer 7, supra note 50 (talking about one defendant company and
saying the people have been “fabulous.... [E]specially since the settlement, we have gotten to
watch inside a company while they figure out how to do it right, and they’re so dedicated ....
[T]hey’re doing a great job and they’re making a great effort, and I mean, that’s kind of the2012] DISABILITY CAUSE LAWYERS 1317
statutes used in disability cases, these lawyers viewed damages as
a tool to get the attention of companies and industries and encour-
age them to become more disability-accessible.
145 During the inter-
views, lawyers expressed little interest in taking a case that in-
volved only a request for damage relief; they viewed such action as
a poor vehicle for changing behavior.
146 
No lawyers we interviewed brought constitutional cases as a reg-
ular part of their practice. A poll showed a near-uniform consensus
among the lawyers that constitutional litigation was not a priority
or even a significant item on the litigation agenda.
147 Although the
specific explanation varied, the overriding view was that within the
disability realm, a rich statutory field existed but the constitutional
landscape was bleak, especially under the Equal Protection Clause,
which did not offer meaningful protection—or at least any protec-
tion in excess of what the ADA and other relevant statutes pro-
vided.
148 One lawyer observed, “I would totally use the Constitution
if it helped us.... [T]he Constitution is very weak on this, and so I’ve
thrown it in, but mostly it hasn’t been the lead for us because it’s
best set case scenario for us.”); see also Interview with Lawyer 3 and Lawyer 4, supra note 52
(statement of Lawyer 3) (noting culture change in a defendant company with whom they
settled); Interview with Lawyer 8, supra note 50 (noting that one defendant, Target, is “a
perfect example now.... Target works with us and wants to make sure that they maintain
accessibility and are more of a partner now.... [W]e really are trying to create an environment
of partnerships.”). 
145. See,  e.g.,  Interview  with  Lawyer  2,  supra  note  51  (“[W]e  know  that  people  are
motivated  to  make  money  and  we  know  that  they  are  motivated  not  to  lose  money  ...
especially corporations that have to be answerable, and so we want to create concern about
liability.”). 
146. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 13, supra note 1 (“[W]e don’t take cases where the
only relief sought would be damages.... [W]e’d only keep the focus on providing access itself.”). 
147. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 51 (“I think that because we have that
sort of rich panoply of laws on the federal level with the 504, IDEA and ADA ... I think that
that’s generally right that we primarily work in the statutory realm. It’s pretty rare that we
are working in the constitutional realm or in something really cutting edge like that.”);
Interview with Lawyer 7, supra note 50 (“[I]n this area it seems to me like ... Title II and the
Rehab Act are much stronger tools.”); Interview with Lawyer 11, supra note 57 (“For the cases
that we have here ... we live well with the statute. There’s not a pressing need to use the
Constitution.”). 
148. In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985), the
Supreme Court held that people with disabilities were only entitled to rational basis scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause. This principle has been affirmed in subsequent cases. See,
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weak  on  disability  and  [is  even]  used  against  us  on  disability
issues.”
149 Another explained:
I live in an age when Federal courts are not going to interpret
the Federal Constitution in ways that are going to assist me,
and so unless I have a case that absolutely screams out for it,
I’m not going to be looking for novel constitutional theories
because all I’m likely to accomplish in doing that is to create a
precedent that will foreclose those who come after me in what I
hope will be a warmer judicial climate. 
... I’m a craftsman, and I use whatever tools look appropriate to
the task.
150 
Several  lawyers  thought  that  the  constitutional  landscape
reflected a society and judiciary that still viewed disability from a
medical—and pitying—perspective, not as a true civil rights issue.
151
They believed litigation could help play a role in changing that
perspective.
152 
Several  lawyers  acknowledged  the  constitutional  backdrop  of
several important disability rights laws, particularly the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA);
153 they also discussed the
importance of using constitutional law defensively to respond to
challenges  of  the  constitutional  underpinnings  of  disability
149. Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 25; see also Interview with Lawyer 9, supra note
51 (“[I]t’s not clear what the Constitution gives you that the ADA doesn’t.... I kind of think
we’ve exhausted the Constitution, that we’ve got this new civil rights statute; let’s run with
it.”).
150. Interview with Lawyer 2, supra note 51.
151. See id. (“I don’t see how you can do constitutional litigation in the disability area until
you have judges whose perception[s] of disability move[] away from the sympathy narrative
to the rights narrative.”); see also Interview with Lawyer 8, supra note 50 (noting that the
level of scrutiny is reflective of the fact that “people don’t think about disability rights on the
same level as racial discrimination or race-based civil rights”). 
152. See Interview with Lawyer 10, supra note 58 (“I think ADA litigation ... can be very
valuable in the sense that if you’ve got a fresh case with egregious facts, it helps remind the
public that this stuff is going on; that this kind of discrimination is still going on, and it’s
discrimination, and there should be a law against it, and there is. So from my perspective
fresh cases that help remind the public of what goes on [with] sophisticated employers and
unsophisticated employers is valuable.”); see also Interview with Lawyer 12, supra note 47
(“[Y]ou [can] have a good fact pattern that the judge could actually see ... is not some pie-in-
the-sky thing; you actually have a bunch of people with severe disabilities functioning in the
community.”). 
153. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1419 (2006).2012] DISABILITY CAUSE LAWYERS 1319
statutes.
154 Although a few lawyers provided some limited examples
of using constitutional law,
155 some musings of how it might be
useful in the future,
156 and some frustration over the limited range
of constitutional arguments raised by disability rights lawyers,
157
the lawyers did not have a short-term or long-term constitutional
strategy.
158 Noting the limited vision of judges in this area, one
lawyer observed, “If the day comes when I think that I’ve got not
just a judge before me but the reviewing court that will understand
this issue, that is to say disability in the context of constitutional
rights, then I’ll start doing it.”
159
Related to constitutional law, we polled the lawyers about the role
of Supreme Court litigation in the disability rights movement. We
also specifically asked for reactions to our prior observation that
none of the ADA cases that had gone up to the Supreme Court had
been  engineered  from  the  trial  court  level  by  disability  cause
lawyers.
160 The participation of these lawyers in Supreme Court
cases included two lawyers who had argued cases in front of the
Supreme Court, a few lawyers who had been part of strategy con-
ference calls, and several lawyers who had limited input into the
Supreme Court cases; nearly all interviewed lawyers had partici-
pated in amicus briefs for the cases.
161 One organization worked to
bring together disability rights lawyers to provide input for cases
that  had  reached  the  level  of  Supreme  Court  review.
162 A  f e w
154. See,  e.g.,  Interview  with  Lawyer  1,  supra  note  25  (“I  don’t  think  we’ve  needed
[constitutional law] that much except to say the ADA is okay.”). 
155. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 7, supra note 50 (discussing work on a case “involving
a prisoner with mental illness that has 8th Amendment and Due Process claims”). 
156. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 25 (“[W]here I think [constitutional law
has]  been  underused  and  where  we  may  need  it  is  in  special  education,  and  nobody
remembers that the statute is not the point in special education.... [T]he statute is based on
a series of constitutional decisions.”). 
157. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 6, supra note 57 (noting frustration that lawyers in
Garrett did not provide any argument that Cleburne was no longer good law). 
158. See,  e.g.,  Interview  with  Lawyer  1,  supra  note  25  (remarking  that  taking
constitutional cases to the Supreme Court is not on the short-term agenda). 
159. Interview with Lawyer 2, supra note 51.
160. See Stein et al., supra note 4, at 1661-63, 1670-72.
161. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 25 (noting that he had taken cases to
the Supreme Court and drafted amicus briefs); Interview with Lawyer 2, supra note 51
(drafting  amicus  briefs);  Interview  with  Lawyer  12,  supra  note  47  (discussing  strategy
conference calls).
162. See Interview with Lawyer 9, supra note 51 (“We developed an approach to bringing1320 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1287
lawyers had also been involved in at least one successful attempt to
keep a potentially harmful case out of the Supreme Court.
163 The
lawyers expressed a desire to do more of this in the future, but no
lawyer articulated a clear plan or strategy for accomplishing that
goal. Other lawyers were frustrated that disability rights lawyers
were not more active in Supreme Court litigation, but they ques-
tioned, “[D]id the [NAACP] have its drive-by lawyers out there? How
did they control people from coming in and bringing annoying small
marginal cases that the Supreme Court would seize ahold of?”
164
Others expressed similar sentiments. Some lawyers thought the
disability rights community needed to place more of a premium on
cultivating  a  lawyer  with  the  life  experience  of  a  person  with
disabilities who could argue cases before the Court.
165 
the disability community together around Supreme Court cases ... to organize and coordinate
the disabilities response to Supreme Court cases.”). This lawyer also noted that these sessions
had strengthened the relationship between disability cause lawyers and the community. See
id. (“I’d like to say we made a deliberate decision to strengthen our relationship with the
community, but I think it just kind of happened, and it emerged in part from the Supreme
Court work.”).
163. See Interview with Lawyer 10, supra note 58 (“You know, I remember there were some
cases that the Supreme Court took that we knew were going to be a disaster for us based on
[the] facts [and] there were kind of creative [and successful] efforts to get that case to go
away.”). One lawyer specifically recalled the success of keeping Hason v. Medical Board of
California, 279 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2002), out of the Supreme Court. See Interview with
Lawyer 6, supra note 57. In regards to Hason, we have previously observed: 
Dr. Hason's application for a medical license was denied on the grounds of his
mental illness. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether or not
under these circumstances Title II validly abrogated state sovereign immunity.
In  light  of  an  unsympathetic  plaintiff  and  the  Court's  opinion  in  Garrett,
California disability rights advocates followed a creative strategy to get the case
off of the Court's docket before it could be heard. The advocates prevailed upon
then-Governor  of  California,  Gray  Davis,  to  appoint  a  new  member  of  the
Medical Board who was supportive of disability rights. The Board then agreed
to reconsider the case and reverse its decision. At that point, the case was moot
and the writ of certiorari was dismissed. 
Stein et al., supra note 4, at 1677 (footnotes omitted). The lawyers interviewed that were
involved in this process were unable to recall whether similar efforts were made in some of
the Supreme Court’s definition of disability cases, particularly in Sutton v. United Airlines,
527 U.S. 471 (1999). See Interview with Lawyer 6, supra note 57.
164. Interview with Lawyer 7, supra note 50.
165. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 10, supra note 58 (“I feel like it was in our interest
to cultivate a lawyer with a personal connection to disability who could be up there on a
regular basis talking about these issues ... [to] build that rapport with the Court and help put
a  human  face  on  the  issues....  [I]f  you  have  somebody  that’s  actually  experienced
discrimination and lives with disability every day it may be harder for some of these Justices2012] DISABILITY CAUSE LAWYERS 1321
The  lawyers  advanced  a  general  sense  that  being  before  the
Supreme Court was not a good idea, and that such an appearance
should only occur when the community was brought in on the defen-
sive side.
166 Lawyers expressed skepticism that a Supreme Court
case, even if victorious, could create lasting legal change on the
ground.
167  One  lawyer  put  it  simply:  “[I]f  you  don’t  need  the
Supreme Court, don’t use it.”
168 Another lawyer explained, “I would
regard cases getting to the Supreme Court in the disability area by
and large to be the result of unfortunate accidents.... I don’t see this
Court as one I’m anxious to get to with a case.”
169 When asked about
the cases that have gone up to the Supreme Court, this lawyer
replied: 
I look at Garrett and I think that this is a Court ... that is not
going to be a champion of disability rights and therefore it is
very much in our opponents’ interest to get cases up there and
very much in our interest to figure out successful litigation
strategies that don’t require it.
170 
This lawyer explained that he had thought about bringing a case
that would highlight a circuit split on the issue of website accessi-
bility under Title III, but then realized that with existing tools,
including  state  statutes,  he  could  force  the  industry  to  become
accessible.
171 
that are critical swing votes to pull them out.”). 
166. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 51 (noting that, generally speaking,
disability cases should stay out of the Supreme Court).
167. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 25 (“The Supreme Court is not ahead
of the curve on this, on our issues. Maybe someday they will be.... You can’t just go do Brown
v. Board of Education and racism goes away. All that other stuff still has to happen. You still
have to do the local stuff, you still have to ... create an integrated program ... you still have
to do the legislative pieces, you still have to do the public outreach. The Supreme Court makes
a big statement, but it doesn’t get you there.”). 
168. Id.; see also Interview with Lawyer 13, supra note 1 (“[W]e do generally try to keep our
cases from the Supreme Court.... I think the goal of most civil rights lawyers in every field
these days is to stay out of the Supreme Court.”). 
169. Interview with Lawyer 2, supra note 51.
170. Id. 
171. Id. Another lawyer explained: 
I don’t try to create splits unnecessarily, I stack them all in the good circuits and
then use them to domino the other ones.... So we’re not going to go to the Fifth
Circuit then the Ninth Circuit, I’m going to go to the Ninth Circuit and the First
Circuit, maybe the Second Circuit and the Third Circuit and stack them up and1322 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1287
The lawyers considered whether they should get involved in cases
that lawyers from outside the disability rights community took to
the Supreme Court.
172 At least one professed a desire to spend more
time  and  energy  trying  to  place  on  the  Court  a  Justice  with  a
demonstrated commitment to disability rights.
173
The lawyers expressed some desire for a unifying, important case,
engineered by the disability rights community, that would eventu-
ally go up to the Supreme Court.
174 But no plan for doing so has
been implemented, and the lawyers shared a view that such a tactic
was  difficult,  impracticable,  and  potentially  impossible.
175  One
lawyer observed: “[W]hat is the Brown case that the disability rights
movement needs other than ... [Olmstead]? What interpretation do
we need that will make this huge change that we are not getting?
then use them against the other circuits.
Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 25; see also Interview with Lawyer 9, supra note 51
(noting that when the issue comes up amongst disability lawyers, he always asks, “Why are
you even thinking about taking this case [up] to the Supreme Court?... I mean yes we might
win; but we might also lose. And who is betting on the Supreme Court? I don’t even get it.”);
Interview with Lawyer 11, supra note 57 (“I think the most important thing is winning in the
district court.... And then whatever happens after that, some part of it is under your control
and part of it isn’t.”). 
172. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 25 (“[I]f the defense is taken up to the
Supreme Court, yes we’ll get on board and fight if we have to, but if the plaintiffs are doing
it, yeah you make the decision, you make the calculation, will it help and how bad is the
appellate court decision? Can we live with the appellate court decision?”). This lawyer also
had declined requests to participate in amicus briefs of cases she did not believe were fruitful
to go to the Supreme Court. Id.
173. See Interview with Lawyer 10, supra note 58 (“I’m trying to find the Justice more than
the case right now. To me, in order to get a Brown v. Board of Education you’ve got to have
at least one Justice on the Court who really can write with power, passion, and persuasion
around the issue.”). 
174. See Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 25 (“I think we should decide how we want
to use the Supreme Court, let’s be optimistic that in the next Obama administration there will
be more appointments and it could switch 5 to 4 the other way. How would we intentionally,
proactively use the Supreme Court?”); see also  Interview with Lawyer 8, supra note 50
(“[S]ooner or later another employment law will go up, but I think we as a community [are]
getting better at communicating with each other.... I think we will find a good case and I think
we  will  bring  it  up  ...  Hopefully  we  can  get  a  good  direct  threat  case  or  reasonable
accommodation case up to the Court.”). 
175. See  Interview  with  Lawyer 7, supra  note  50  (stating  that  getting  a  case  to  the
Supreme Court is “situational”); see also Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 51 (“I just don’t
know if there is a federal sort of big national splash type of case that would work right now.”);
Interview with Lawyer 9, supra note 51 (“On the Supreme Court, you can’t possibly have that
degree of ... control.”). 2012] DISABILITY CAUSE LAWYERS 1323
We don’t have a [separate but equal] doctrine to knock down.”
176
Another stated: 
I don’t think it’s that easy to set up a case that’s going to go to
the Supreme Court, I don’t know anybody who’s done it and at
the end said, “See, [I] made it to the Supreme Court and I won.”
I don’t think you can say you’re going to bring this case and take
it to the Supreme Court. 
....
It takes so long, maybe I lack imagination to see this is the issue
that’s going to work through in this way that’s not going to get
mooted out and that’s going to interest the Supreme Court eight
years down the line.
177
Notably, for several of these lawyers, while the Supreme Court
cases that had limited the definition of disability were unfortunate,
they did not impact the core of their practices because these lawyers
typically represented individuals who were covered by even a re-
strictive vision of the ADA’s definition of disability.
178 
E. Other Forms of Advocacy
Despite the fact that the lawyers were selected specifically for
their use of litigation on behalf of people with disabilities, nearly
every lawyer engaged in some other type of advocacy besides liti-
gation. Most of these lawyers had some level of engagement with
the legislative process, whether it was having input into proposed
legislation, or advocating for, or assisting in, drafting state and
federal laws.
179 Some lawyers felt that this was a way to ensure that
new regulations did not move the law backwards from what they
had achieved in litigation.
180 Other lawyers had particular expertise
176. Interview with Lawyer 2, supra note 51.
177. Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 25.
178. See Interview with Lawyer 9, supra note 51 (noting that the decisions considering the
ADA’s definition of disability were not a huge problem in his cases); see also Interview with
Lawyer 11, supra note 57 (“The Supreme Court cases ... on [the definition of disability] ...
[were] no hindrance to us in our cases, and certainly now with the ADA [Amendments Act]
there’s no hindrance at all.... I was trying to think of something that we did not bring because
of the disability-defined issue, and I can’t think of any.”).
179. See supra note 51.
180. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 3 and Lawyer 4, supra note 52 (statement of Lawyer1324 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1287
in working with administrative agencies to influence how the laws
were implemented and enforced.
181 Several lawyers had relation-
ships with legislators and other government officials and used these
relationships to help advance the disability cause.
182 In working on
legislative issues, these litigators felt their expertise, experience,
and skills were useful. In particular, they had gained knowledge in
litigation about how legislation actually operated and what reform
was needed.
183 The lawyers also exhibited some level of coordination
and  work  with  public  enforcement  officials,  particularly  in  the
Obama administration.
184
4) (“I think our main [goal] at least in this regulatory process is to make sure that the
government doesn’t bring us backwards.... We don’t want the law to move backwards, and so
we feel like we have to protect what we’ve already gained.”).
181. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 25 (“[W]hen I [want to] change the law,
I go through the regulatory process or through the legislative process or through the press or
public process. And that’s how you change the law—you go to the implementers and get them
to implement it differently.”).
182. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 9, supra note 51 (“[W]e’ve always had a policy arm,
which means people who do traditional D.C. lobbying and with Congress [and] agencies.... [I]n
the  last  five  years,  maybe  even  longer,  the  lawyers  have  done  most  of  the  civil  rights
lobbying.”); see also id. (“[W]e’re spending a lot of time ... [with] the Obama administration
working with ... the Civil Rights Division [of the Justice Department].”). 
183. See Interview with Lawyer 6, supra note 57 (“Our experience in all these cases too
really informs our legislative work on law.... [In the reauthorization of the IDEA] [t]here was
a lot of push to make sure that it said that to be educated that a kid would have access to the
general curriculum; it was like a big issue, and we understood it, but we also knew how that
could backfire [for us] because ... the kids we mainly ... represent [in education,] the most
severely disabled kids ... we think it’s important for them to be included but we don’t think
they are going to [be included in] the general curriculum.... And so we can bring a perspective
because we ... are very aware of how things could work in the field and [because] our parent
advocates ... talk to hundreds of parents [of disabled children].”); see also Interview with
Lawyer 3 and Lawyer 4, supra note 52 (statement of Lawyer 3) (acknowledging “a kind of
responsibility that we are lawyers, we are good writers, this [is] what we do, [and] it’s been
a real privilege for the past 15 years to work with the blind community and we are ... uniquely
situated to do [this work].... But I kind of feel we have an obligation to do it because we have
a lot of information.... [W]e see big-picture things.”).
184. See Interview with Lawyer 2, supra note 51 (“The other big change is that we have the
[Obama]  administration  where  there  are  people  we  can  call  at  the  White  House,  the
Department of Justice, the Department of Education ... and so having those resources has
made it obvious that we’ve got some additional tools to use.”); see also Interview with Lawyer
8, supra note 50 (“[The] EEOC, state [Fair Employment] Practice agencies, or state human
rights entities or DOJ ... under the Obama administration, we’ve been working with a much
more receptive DOJ, so we’re working with DOJ a lot these days.... In a lot of these access
cases or systemic change cases, we’re finding that DOJ is interested in them.”); Interview with
Lawyer 12, supra note 47 ([The relationship with the DOJ] just changed overnight in the last
two years ... and it’s fabulous.... They are intervening in our cases, and now they’re bringing2012] DISABILITY CAUSE LAWYERS 1325
When queried about why they spent time involved in the legis-
lative process, the lawyers had varying answers. Although legisla-
tive work was commonly viewed as an effective strategy that had
delivered results before, often the lawyers recognized that there was
no alternative but to go to the legislature.
185 One lawyer who prac-
ticed prior to the ADA’s passage noted that at a meeting of top civil
rights leaders in the 1980s, the disability rights movement had
made a deliberate initial decision to establish a legislative presence
in Washington: 
[S]o we set up the Washington office.... In terms of, the real
thinking, the real strategizing, the real people—the representa-
tives  that  went  to  the  meeting  with  the  [members  of  Con-
gress]—they  were  all  race  and  sex  [advocacy  groups]  and
unions.... [T]here weren’t disability [advocacy groups], and that
was our goal to try and get disability included in that. So that
was very conscious, and then we had a choice for us with our
limited  resources,  we  spent  a  lot  of  time  in  D.C.  on  this....
Opportunities develop as you develop relationships.
186
Lawyers took the view that when the courts cut into civil rights
protections for people with disabilities, the legislature could be an
alternative forum, and often it proved to be more receptive. As one
lawyer explained: 
[W]e realize that the law as it is can’t always help us. We can
use it creatively, we can use it effectively, but sometimes we just
got to go change the law and a lot of us who are, you know,
involved  in  the  litigation  are  also  involved  in  trying  to  get
Congress,  or  in  some  cases,  of  course,  [state]  legislators,  to
change the law.
187 
This work predated the ADA. One lawyer noted that while the
IDEA was grounded in those constitutional cases in the education
realm that had a positive result, the ADA statute itself went far
their own.”). 
185. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 2, supra note 51 (“[T]here are areas that the only
thing we can do is legislation.”). 
186. Interview with Lawyer 6, supra note 57.
187. Interview with Lawyer 8, supra note 50.1326 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1287
beyond what  constitutional  litigation could provide.
188 And while
the initial equal protection disability cases were not successful, the
disability rights issue was on the legislative radar, and Congress
soon passed section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act in 1973.
189 Once
this happened, there was an opportunity to have more influence
with the regulations than could have happened with constitutional
litigation. This approach of restoring rights the Court had taken
away continued through the passage of the ADAAA, and several of
the lawyers contributed to the negotiations behind the Act.
190 There
was a view among some lawyers that litigation losses helped create
leverage in legislatures by grabbing the legislatures’ attention.
191
Nearly every lawyer interviewed had some type of strategy for
dealing with media. In one approach, lawyers used the media to
portray positive images of defendants trying to help and work with
people with disabilities as a way to motivate more companies to
make changes.
192 But the more prevalent view was more traditional,
where lawyers called press conferences when filing a lawsuit—or
upon  its  successful  resolution—to  educate  the  public  as  to  the
problem and to pressure potential future defendants into modifying
their behavior.
193 One lawyer characterized media use as “critical,”
188. See Interview with Lawyer 6, supra note 57.
189. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44
WM.  &  MARY  L.  REV.  921,  958  (2003);  Michael  Selmi,  Interpreting  the  Americans  with
Disabilities Act: Why the Supreme Court Rewrote the Statute, and Why Congress Did Not Care,
76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 531-32 (2008).
190. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 10, supra note 58 (detailing how litigators were
involved in the negotiation process leading up to the passage of the ADA).
191. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 2, supra note 51 (“[S]ometimes we have to litigate and
lose before the legislature is willing to do anything.”).
192. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 3 and Lawyer 4, supra note 52 (statement of Lawyer
4) (stating that he always attempts to do “positive press”); see also id. (statement of Lawyer
3) (“[O]ur first principle is that it’s better to say something good about someone than to say
something bad.”). One lawyer also noted that she sought press on settlements. She thought
press was good because it gave “the corporations something that they can feel good about
because it makes them more vested in the process, in the issues. And it pleases their boards
so  they  get  this  good  press  for  doing  this  good  thing  for  people  with  disabilities.”  Id.
(statement of Lawyer 4); see also Interview with Lawyer 13, supra note 1 (“[The media is] key
in at least 90% of our cases.... [W]e are focused on providing equal access ... on opening doors
for opportunities and we’re focused on discrimination by large, well-resourced entities.... [I]n
those situations the media is a tool that we see as effective to a certain extent in helping to
achieve the result that we are looking for.”). 
193. See Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 51 (“We announce mostly the filing of cases
and do press conferences.”); see also Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 25 (“I think press2012] DISABILITY CAUSE LAWYERS 1327
noting that he not only tries “to deliver the message that we are
going to do something” but also “to get the word out to the individ-
ual companies that may be at the wrong end of a piece of liti-
gation.”
194 This same lawyer explained, “You need to have a public
agenda” and that “you don’t want to put your cards close to the vest
here,” because “it is in our interest ... for the folks who are develop-
ing [new products] to know we are planning to do something.”
195
Another explained: 
[W]hen we file the complaint, we issue a press release, and as
major things happen in the case, we issue press releases and
we’ve gotten very good at getting those releases everywhere and
generating interest and getting the people involved in the case
talking to the media and explaining what’s going [on,] and we
view that  as  a very important way of getting the word out
there.... [B]ecause, if you don’t publicize it, then a few people
may know about what’s going on, but the investment that we’ve
put into the cases won’t be as well used if we don’t get the word
out there, so that the public understands that we’re trying to
change attitudes and practices and get people to think about the
way the world is structured.
196
Finally, other lawyers noted how using the media could be helpful
to draw other potential plaintiffs to bring their claims to these
lawyers.
197
is important because judges read the news, too, as we discovered in the voting cases.... [Press
coverage] points out problems that legislators have noticed before or state government people
hadn’t noticed before, [and] it points out ways of thinking about things that people hadn’t
thought about before.”). Several lawyers felt this tactic had been unsuccessful and needed
more attention. See Interview with Lawyer 7, supra note 50 (“We have tried to use [the media]
in the sense of maybe a little bit of public shaming will bring people to the table, [but] it never
has.”); see also Interview with Lawyer 10, supra note 58 (“I don’t think the media part is
handled in a kind of professional and systematic way consistently.... Certainly [litigators]
respond to questions from reporters and they try to be thoughtful about how to position the
case in the media, but I don’t think they get that it may be worth actually having a staff
position that’s focused on that.”). 
194. Interview with Lawyer 2, supra note 51.
195. Id.
196. Interview with Lawyer 8, supra note 50.
197. See Interview with Lawyer 3 and Lawyer 4, supra note 52.1328 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1287
F. Disability Cause Lawyers and Other Civil Rights Communities
We queried these lawyers about their connections with other
disability cause lawyers. Nearly all professed a belief that these
relationships  were  ongoing and important, even among lawyers
that primarily  serviced  different communities of people with dis-
abilities.
198 Although we did not ask the lawyers for the names of
lawyers whom they contact regularly, these names did come up
when discussing their work. Nearly every lawyer mentioned another
lawyer that was on our list of lawyers to be interviewed. 
Although the picture was one of a movement that, in its current
iteration, was still in the early stages of building relationships,
199
the lawyers almost all described the DRBA as a useful tool to share
information and network. As one explained, “What DRBA grew out
of ... there wasn’t a place where we could talk about these issues on
a high level without getting distracted by people who had different
agendas.”
200 Another elaborated that “on a very basic level it’s very
good that everybody shares their ideas so that everyone’s cases are
stronger.”
201 For now, lawyers identified the key utility of the DRBA
as its listserve, which one lawyer described as “an incredible brain
trust of interesting ideas.”
202 Another explained that “[the DRBA]
facilitates interaction in [realtime] speed. You can ask a question
[and] it gets there immediately. I’ve had good experiences of having
a discussion on the DRBA and then having it spin off a little bit ...
so that you talk to people and work on projects together.”
203 Another
observed that the DRBA listserve was a source of shared insights
and creativity: “[if] [s]omebody has dealt with a particular expert
198. See Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 51 (“We couldn’t do [this kind of work]
without our network.”); see also  Interview with Lawyer 3 and Lawyer 4, supra note 52
(statement of Lawyer 3) (recounting wide range of contacts among lawyers who do this work,
and noting that contacts went beyond lawyers who represented blind individuals); Interview
with Lawyer 7, supra note 50 (noting how she knows people in different parts of the country,
and discussing how, before opening practice, the lawyers in her firm met with disability rights
lawyers in different parts of the country).
199. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 13, supra note 1 (“[W]e’re really at the beginning
point, I’d say, of disability cause lawyer[ing].... [N]ot a lot of people [are] talking to each other
in the legal field about coordinating their efforts.”). 
200. Interview with Lawyer 3 and Lawyer 4, supra note 52 (statement of Lawyer 3).
201. Id. (statement of Lawyer 4).
202. Interview with Lawyer 7, supra note 50.
203. Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 51.2012] DISABILITY CAUSE LAWYERS 1329
before, tackled a defense attorney before, the ability to share that
information, can allow you to do a much better job.”
204
The lawyers shared a collective hope that the DRBA would grow
and begin to serve additional functions. Several lawyers noted that
they would like the DRBA to function more like a true bar assoc-
iation, offering seminars, taking positions in amicus briefs, and
having  a  brief  bank.
205  They  also  shared  a  vision  of  the  DRBA
serving an additional mentoring and training role, and even ex-
erting some measure of discipline and limited control over which
cases rise to the Supreme Court.
206 As one lawyer explained:
[When someone has their first disability rights case,] we would
intervene at a mentoring stage ... [and] we’ll get them someone
to advise them.... [Currently, these cases are] not being treated
the way we would treat them.... So we give that advice and
resources to the people who are just doing the case or just
starting and to people who want to start a disability rights
practice.
207 
This lawyer continued:
[A]t the higher levels when one of us is approached or sees a case
going to an appellate court or going wrong in some way ... we’ll
then be able to reach out to those lawyers and offer them help at
that stage and at every stage. If it’s preventing things from
going to Supreme Court unnecessarily.... [H]alf the time the
lawyer who did it at the lower court level [thinks,] “Shoot I don’t
want to take this one. Who will take it?” Or, “who will help me?
Who will counsel me?”
208 
204. Interview with Lawyer 2, supra note 51.
205. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 7, supra note 50; Interview with Lawyer 11, supra
note 57.
206. Cf. Interview with Lawyer 7, supra note 50 (implying that the DRBA should develop
more of a litigation strategy); Interview with Lawyer 11, supra note 57.
207. Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 25.
208. Id.; see also Interview with Lawyer 8, supra note 50 (“We’ve got to form a stronger
network and so when we start hearing about these cases we can talk to each other and go to
some of the lawyers who have taken them and say, ‘Hey, we’re out here, you know, you need
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This lawyer noted that they can help frame the issues for the courts
of appeals or the Supreme Court, but noted there are limits on what
they could do.
209 In addition, this lawyer suggested disability rights
advocacy trainings on practical issues, including discovery, Daubert,
negotiations, and IEP advocacy.
210 Finally, this lawyer was hopeful
that the DRBA could be an organizing vehicle for case aggregation,
where the group identifies a common issue and everyone files a case
on it at the same time.
211
Given  their  background  and  interest  in  social  justice,  most
lawyers interviewed had relationships—and in some cases, working
partnerships—with lawyers for other civil rights groups.
212 Often
these relationships developed around certain issues like employ-
ment or voting that impacted both people with disabilities and other
communities. For lawyers who practiced at the inception of the
disability rights era, many of these relationships were crucial in
leading to disability rights’ “coming of age” as a civil rights move-
ment. In some instances, the lawyers expressed a desire to improve
and grow these relationships,
213 although such collaboration was not
without controversy in the disability community.
214
II. DISABILITY CAUSE LAWYERS AS CAUSE LAWYERS 
Our interviews comprise the first in-depth research on post-ADA
disability cause lawyers. What emerges is a portrait of disability
cause lawyers who operate within their legal and political culture.
Rather than trying to dramatically alter the legal landscape through
209. See Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 25.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See,  e.g.,  Interview  with  Lawyer  9,  supra  note  51  (“[We]  tend  to  put  together  a
consortium of legal organizations.”). 
213. See Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 25 (“[W]e’re very often trying to build on
what [the other civil rights groups have] done.... We know the regulatory arena, and they are
also trying to build on what we’ve done. So right now [the Lawyers Committee for Civil
Rights] is trying to build on the ADA Amendments Act approach.”); see also Interview with
Lawyer 5, supra note 51 (“I’m doing a project with ... [the] National Center for Lesbian Rights
and ... talking about ... some of the ideas from disability rights.... [T]hose concepts might be
useful for people who are transgender[ed].”).
214. See  Interview  with  Lawyer  9,  supra  note  51  (“Not  everyone  in  the  disability
community is wild about the idea of the ACLU getting involved but we have what capacity we
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the creation of new legal rights, these lawyers leverage their omni-
bus civil rights statute with the goal of changing behavior across the
industry and with individual defendants. In a sense, their task is
Sisyphan: they litigate to educate defendants about the legal and
business rationale for disability inclusiveness, and even when suc-
cessful, they find themselves facing another defendant with similar
biases and concerns about cost. In this Part, we set forth a brief
history of the disability rights movement to highlight the unique
circumstances within which the lawyers we interviewed operate.
Here, culture is key to understanding differences between disability
cause lawyers and lawyers for other groups. We then turn to several
critiques of cause lawyering generally in order to situate the self-
reported work of disability cause lawyers.
A. Unique Political and Legal Landscape
Disability cause lawyers, much like cause lawyers for other social
movements, are a product of their movement’s history. Americans
with  disabilities,  as  a  group,  have  become  progressively  em-
powered by antidiscrimination protections since the late 1960s.
215
Paradoxically, the most notable victories were achieved by individu-
als acting of their own initiative or joined together in small, or
disability-specific, coalitions, which lacked direct support from a
large, organized disability rights movement.
216 Specifically, during
the period between 1968 and 1990, Congress passed a series of civil
rights statutes that incrementally expanded the realm of protec-
tion for disabled persons.
217 The passage of each of these statutes
215. The typical narrative of the modern disability rights movement begins around 1970,
when Americans with disabilities began to conceive of themselves as a distinct minority group
and to employ rhetoric from earlier civil rights movements. See, e.g., SHARON BARNARTT &
RICHARD SCOTCH, DISABILITY PROTESTS: CONTENTIOUS POLITICS 1970-1999, at 20-21 (2001);
RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING FEDERAL DISABILITY
POLICY 6 (2d ed. 2001). We note that significant and successful efforts existed prior to 1970,
even if they remain largely unrecognized. See PAUL K. LONGMORE, WHY I BURNED MY BOOK
AND OTHER ESSAYS ON DISABILITY 32-101 (2003) (relating vignettes of pre-1970 disability
rights activities and arguing for the necessity of a comprehensive disability rights legal
history). 
216. See Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations
as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 628 (2004) (“People with disabilities remain
largely uncoordinated (and sometimes conflicted) in their activities.” (footnote omitted)).
217. Chronologically, these are the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-480,1332 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1287
followed a similar course. Disability rights supporters, individually
or with similarly minded collaborators, diverged from traditional
civil  rights  methods  of  large-scale  protests  and  constitutional
litigation,  and  instead  achieved  their  goals  without  the  visible
backing of a larger movement.
218 This approach played a crucial role
in the ADA’s passage.
219 Although the Congress that enacted the
ADA “was among the most prolific in our nation’s history when it
came to Civil Rights legislation,”
220 the statute did not enjoy the
broad public support or backing of powerful lobbyists that bolstered
the passage of other civil rights statutes.
221 Nor did the disability
rights movement have a figurehead such as a Martin Luther King,
82 Stat. 718 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151-4157 (2006)); the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29
U.S.C.); the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat.
773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1405, 1406, 1415-1419, and since renamed the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act); and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213). Other
notable enactments include the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act
of  1975,  Pub.  L.  No.  94-103,  89  Stat.  486;  the  Voting  Accessibility  for  the  Elderly  and
Handicapped Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-435, 98 Stat. 1678; the Air Carrier Access Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-435, 100 Stat. 1080; and the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619.
218. At times, these uncoordinated lobbying efforts worked at cross purposes. For example,
the curb cuts sought by the American Federation of the Physically Handicapped, whose
members included wheelchair users, were opposed by the American Federation of the Blind,
whose many cane-using members felt more secure knowing where pavements ended. See
JOSEPH  P.  SHAPIRO,  NO  PITY:  PEOPLE  WITH  DISABILITIES  FORGING  A  NEW  CIVIL  RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 126 (1993). 
219. See,  e.g.,  FRED  PELKA,  THE  ABC-CLIO  COMPANION  TO  THE  DISABILITY  RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 181 (1997) (noting that Washington insider Evan Kemp, a “self-described ‘insider’”
who himself used a wheelchair, played a pivotal role in advancing the disability rights agenda
of the 1980s and in educating President George H.W. Bush on disability issues to the point
where the president was willing to support and sign the ADA); Ruth Colker, The ADA’s
Journey Through Congress, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 2 (2004) (noting that the ADA was the
“culmination of more than two decades of law reform efforts by the disability community”
itself and those advocates within that community); see also Bagenstos, supra note 189, at 985
(“Disability rights advocates increasingly relied on welfare reform arguments as the political
climate turned toward fiscal retrenchment and against extension of civil rights policies in the
late 1970s and the 1980s.... [This strategy] appeal[ed] to the conservatives, neoconservatives,
and neoliberals who now held the balance of power in Washington.” (footnote omitted)). 
220. Selmi, supra note 189, at 540-41.
221. For instance, the American Association of Retired Persons went full bore to support
passage of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. See id. at 540.2012] DISABILITY CAUSE LAWYERS 1333
Jr. or an effective umbrella group like the National Organization for
Women to speak on its behalf.
222
In contrast to their legislative successes, pre-ADA disability cause
lawyers met an uneven reception at the Supreme Court. Litigation
bringing claims under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the
IDEA,  or  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  before  the  Burger  Court
(1969-1986), as well as the Rehnquist Court before the advent of
the ADA (1986-1990), received a decidedly mixed reception.
223 The
Supreme Court upheld rights of people with disabilities in theory,
but in a parsimonious manner that limited future practical applica-
tion.
224 Consequently, modern disability rights advocates learned at
an early stage that contrary to the experience of predecessor social
justice movements, pursuing protection from Congress provided
greater advantages than bringing litigation before the Supreme
Court.
225 Ultimately, this determination led disability cause lawyers
to turn toward Congress when seeking to expand disability rights
and to turn away from the post-ADA Rehnquist Court when seeking
to enforce those protections.
226 In keeping with this history, it is
therefore unsurprising that the lawyers we interviewed felt com-
fortable in the legislative realm; those with early movement con-
nections expressly observed that this was a space within which they
had learned to inhabit and maneuver. 
Partially as a result, the disability cause lawyers we interviewed
find themselves in a different political and legal landscape than
lawyers for other movements. Unlike other groups, the post-ADA
222. Although the movement did not use massive demonstrations, they did employ a
handful of visible protests that garnered attention. The most dramatic of these was a staged
“crawl up” of the stairs to the then-inaccessible Capitol building by wheelchair users from the
advocacy group Americans Disabled for Accessible Public Transit (ADAPT). See Steven A.
Holmes, Disabled Protest and Are Arrested, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1990, at B7. 
223. See Stein et al., supra note 4, at 1676 & n.56.
224. See RUTH O’BRIEN, CRIPPLED JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF MODERN DISABILITY POLICY
IN THE WORKPLACE (2001) (arguing that the Justices subscribed to the “whole man” schema,
a variant of the medical model of disability, in which disabled persons are expected to comply
with social expectations or forego opportunities). 
225. See, e.g., PELKA, supra note 219, at 18-20 (discussing the work of the chair of the
National Council on the Handicapped to bring the disability rights issue before Congress in
the late 1980s).
226. See Stein et al., supra note 4, at 1670-75; see also STEPHEN L. PERCY, DISABILITY, CIVIL
RIGHTS, AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE POLITICS OF IMPLEMENTATION 56-62 (1989) (discussing the
background to the 1970s legislation on education).1334 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1287
disability  cause  lawyers  began  their  efforts  with  an  omnibus
antidiscrimination statute in hand that conferred significant rights
that other groups had to seek through the courts. Hence, many
traditional cause lawyer accounts focus on litigation campaigns as
a vehicle for creating rights.
227 These accounts are inapposite to the
work of disability cause lawyers, who view their role as challenging
deeply entrenched resistance to enforcement of existing law.
228 At
the same time, disability cause lawyers believed, like lawyers in
other progressive social movements, that they are operating in a
conservative judicial climate.
229 
Moreover, it is a bit misleading to speak of a disability movement
in the traditional sense. The disability “movement” is made up of
discrete  constituencies  with  separate  lived  experiences.
230  And
although these different groups have cohesively joined together in
the past, the reality persists that for many purposes, these groups
operate within individual silos.
231 This dispersion was reflected in
the work of the lawyers we interviewed, the majority of whom had
ties to, and primarily worked for, discrete communities of people
with disabilities. This also makes for an interesting comparison
227. See, e.g., GENNA RAE MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 218-20 (1985) (discussing the career of an African-American
litigator who pursued civil rights changes in the Court); cf. Peter H. Schuck, Public Law
Litigation and Social Reform, 102 YALE L.J. 1763, 1772 (1993) (book review) (suggesting that
the litigation-based critique of cause lawyering focuses solely on constitutional litigation,
whereas “[s]ocial reform through statutory interpretation has a distinctive dynamic that
produces its own patterns of cause and consequence”).
228. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
229. See Interview with Lawyer 3 and Lawyer 4, supra note 52 (statement of Lawyer 4)
(“[T]he courts are bad.”); see also supra notes 113-14, 121, 132 and accompanying text. This
is  in  accord  with  the  perceptions  of  other  progressive  public  interest  lawyers.  See,  e.g.,
Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Law: The Movement at Midlife, 60 STAN. L. REV. 2027, 2037
(2008) (“Most other leaders [of progressive organizations] saw the courts as more ideological
and less open and responsive ... to the law and facts.”(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
230. See DORIS Z. FLEISHER & FRIEDA ZAMES, THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT: FROM
CHARITY  TO  CONFRONTATION  2-46  (2001)  (chronicling  the  various  and  distinct  disability
protests that make up the movement); see also BARNARTT & SCOTCH, supra note 215, at 109-38
(discussing unity and disunity within the disability rights movement and noting that major
differences in experiences and goals exist). According to one scholar, these tensions and
conflicting goals remain as of the present day, often leaving courts and policymakers faced
with opposing views as to what comprises equality within the disability context. See SAMUEL
R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 148-50
(2009).
231. See Rhode, supra note 229, at 2045; see also BARNARTT & SCOTCH, supra note 215, at
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with other social movements. Despite earlier conceptions of the
NAACP as representing a monolithic group, scholars now recognize
that it too had differences and divisions,
232 much like all social
movements.
233
The disability movement is unique in the extent to which other-
wise  disparate  agendas  are  only  rarely  bridged  through  cross-
disability litigation initiatives. Other groups have coalesced around
certain issue areas—for instance, libertarians and religious con-
servatives resisting eminent domain use
234 and gays and lesbians
pursuing same sex marriage
235—despite internal conflicts.
236 They
also face a more consistent set of adversaries than disability cause
lawyers, who are trying to implement a broad remedial scheme
amongst diverse constituencies, including employers, businesses,
and public entities.
237 Surprisingly, none of the lawyers we inter-
viewed  identified  common  defendants,  including  organizational
defendants, that were repeat players in their litigation.
238 Rather
232. See,  e.g.,  TOMIKO  BROWN-NAGIN,  COURAGE  TO  DISSENT:  ATLANTA  AND  THE  LONG
HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 432 (2011); see also Mack, supra note 27, at 263.
233. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 229, at 2045 (“One concern involves the fragmentation of
groups and splintering of their efforts. Too often individual organizations have worked in
silos, in isolation or in competition for resources and recognition.”(citation omitted)); see also
SOUTHWORTH,  supra  note  10,  at  41-66  (commenting  on  divided  constituencies  amongst
conservative lawyers); Rubenstein, supra note 39, at 1680.
234. See SOUTHWORTH, supra note 10, at 101-02.
235. See  Douglas  NeJaime,  Marriage,  Cruising,  and  Life  In  Between:  Clarifying
Organizational Positionalities in Pursuit of Polyvocal Gay-Based Advocacy, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 511, 511 (2003) (noting that, although not uncontroversial, “major GLBT organ-
izations litigate  for the ‘right to marry,’ apparently at the behest of those they seek to
represent.”).
236. In a few instances, the gay and lesbian rights community has divided on litigation
goals to the extent that one particular segment of the community intervened in cases brought
by other members of the community, but siding with defendants to defeat standing. In Smelt
v. County of Orange, a same-sex couple sought a marriage license from the county clerk’s
office. 374 F. Supp. 2d 861, 864 (C.D. Cal. 2005), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 447 F.3d
673 (9th Cir. 2006) (upholding the district court’s dismissal for lack of standing). After suing
in federal court to challenge their denial, defendants argued that plaintiffs did not have
standing to challenge the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat.
2419 (1996). Smelt, 374 F. Supp. 2d at 870. On appeal, cause lawyers for the gay rights
movement—which  included  Lambda  Legal  and  the  National  Center  for  Lesbian  Rights
(representing Equality California)—intervened, arguing that plaintiffs did not have standing
and should abstain. See Stein et al., supra note 4, at 1676 n.55. The intervenors prevailed in
the Ninth Circuit, thus evading potential Supreme Court review. Smelt, 447 F.3d at 686.
237. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
238. To the extent a unified face of resistance to the ADA exists, such resistance comes1336 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1287
than challenging formal barriers or combating animus, disability
cause lawyers are coming up against bias, stigma, and concerns
about cost. This lack of a common adversary, combined with the
absence of an overriding specific right such as the right to marry,
creates a less-organized framework than that of other groups. And
while  disability  rights  activists  share  high-level  commonalities
about independent living, social integration, and autonomy,
239 our
interviews revealed that the specific manifestations of these col-
lective values play out with great variation according to the context
of specific disabilities.
240 
B. Comparing and Critiquing Disability/Cause Lawyers 
To date, the vast and exciting literature on cause lawyering, law
and organizing, and legal mobilization has completely eluded the
experiences of post-ADA disability cause lawyers.
241 This Part situ-
ates disability cause lawyers within these various frameworks. 
1. Court-Centered
A central, albeit increasingly dated, critique of cause lawyering
admonishes advocates for naively looking to the courts—and espe-
cially the Supreme Court—as the vehicle for empowering a particu-
from  popular  culture,  not  from  organized  legal  opposition.  Clint  Eastwood  has  gained
notoriety in disability circles for taking very public stances  against the statute’s public
accommodations provisions, see MARY JOHNSON, MAKE THEM GO AWAY: CLINT EASTWOOD,
CHRISTOPHER REEVE AND THE CASE AGAINST DISABILITY RIGHTS 1 (2003), as well as drawing
the ire of groups like Not Dead Yet for his portrayal in the movie Million Dollar Baby of the
life of someone with a disability as not worth living.
239. See, e.g., Paul K. Longmore & Elizabeth Bouvia, Assisted Suicide and Social Prejudice,
3 ISSUES L. & MED. 141, 147-48 (1987).
240. More research is needed on groups like the American Association of People with
Disabilities that purport to be “mediator” organizations for people with disabilities. See
generally SOUTHWORTH, supra note 10, at 124-49 (defining mediator organizations within a
discussion of lawyers for conservative causes). 
241. See C AUSE  LAWYERING  AND  THE  STATE  IN  A  GLOBAL  ERA,  supra  note  2;  CAUSE
LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES (Austin Sarat &
Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998); CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (Austin Sarat &
Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006); STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO
BELIEVE IN: POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING (2004); THE WORLDS CAUSE
LAWYERS MAKE: STRUCTURE AND AGENCY IN LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note 39; see also THE
CULTURAL LIVES OF CAUSE LAWYERS (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2008). 2012] DISABILITY CAUSE LAWYERS 1337
lar group.
242 Scholars have noted that litigation victories do not
automatically  translate  into  real  change  on  the  ground.
243 Y e t
lawyers are captivated by a “myth of rights”—a “simplistic view of
the interplay between law and social movements according to which
litigation victories directly advance social change.”
244 Part of this
appraisal recognizes that courts are ill-equipped to monitor and
follow  through  on  court  victories:  judgments  achieved  do  not
necessarily translate into judgments enforced.
245 Under this view,
litigation  and  law  enforcement  are  primarily  backward-looking
phenomena, better suited for remedying past wrongs than shaping
future conduct.
246
More  recent  commentators  have  reviewed  the  work  of  cause
lawyers more favorably, suggesting that lawyers can have “a more
sophisticated and promising understanding of the relationship be-
tween law and political progress” through a “politics of rights,”
wherein court rulings are “political assets to be used strategically in
other arenas.”
247 Rather than being single-minded litigation engines,
cause lawyers use litigation pragmatically to complement other ad-
vocacy and mobilization strategies.
248 In consequence, their advocacy
242. The genesis of this critique is attributed to The Hollow Hope, which asserted that
litigation does not produce lasting social consequences. See ROSENBERG, supra note 8, at 341;
see also ARYEH NEIER, ONLY JUDGMENT: THE LIMITS OF LITIGATION IN SOCIAL CHANGE 243
(1982).
243. See Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and
Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, 954 (2007) (“Isolated victories are not readily
translated into sustained efforts for structural change; institutional change tends  to  be
incremental and often illusive.”); Rhode, supra note 229, at 2043 (“Doctrinal change without
a  political  base  to  support  it  is  vulnerable  to  chronic  noncompliance,  public  backlash,
statutory reversal, or judicial retrenchment.”).
244. See SOUTHWORTH, supra note 10, at 149 (discussing Stuart Scheingold’s The Politics
of Rights and comparing the “myth” to an alternative approach that used judicial decisions
only as one piece of the larger strategy). 
245. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1282-84 (1976) (describing resources needed to effectuate civil rights judgments); Lobel,
supra note 243, at 954.
246. See Lobel, supra note 243, at 954; see also Julie Chi-hye Suk, Antidiscrimination Law
in the Administrative State, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 405, 405-06 (suggesting that employment
discrimination law “is mainly enforced through quasi-tort lawsuits against alleged discrim-
inators”). 
247. SOUTHWORTH,  supra  note  10,  at  149  (examining  Scheingold’s  conception  of  the
relationship between law and politics in his work The Politics of Rights). 
248. See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage Equality,
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is seen as generating radiating effects on both the targets of their
litigation and potential allies in the public
249—mobilizing various
constituencies and generating media coverage, which can transform
disputes “in ways that reassign blame and responsibility.”
250
Recent case studies of cause lawyers for different groups have
supported this more nuanced view. In Professor Rhode’s study of a
broad cross-section of public interest lawyers, she observed how
“[m]any leaders ... noted that victory in the courts does not neces-
sarily mean victory in practice,” and that the surveyed leaders rec-
ognized that it is “impossible to create policy, change attitudes, or
build a movement solely through litigation.”
251 Studies of cause
lawyers from the pay-equity and animal rights movements likewise
concluded that these lawyers “did not view litigation as an exclu-
sive end in itself and were very committed to encouraging, enhanc-
ing, and supplementing movement activity.”
252 Moreover, Professor
Southworth’s  studies  of  civil  rights  and  poverty  lawyers  in  the
Chicago area and lawyers for conservative causes paint portraits of
lawyers who use litigation as part of a multidimensional political
strategy that appreciates the constraints of conventional legal work
and thus use litigation as a political asset.
253
In describing their work, the disability cause lawyers we inter-
viewed seemed more aligned with these more recent accounts. They
could most readily be characterized as extreme pragmatists in their
use of litigation. These lawyers were under no illusions that liti-
gation would transform society by creating new rights.
254 Indeed, the
disability cause lawyers explicitly and consistently remarked that
they litigated to change the behavior of specific industry actors.
255
They were quite attuned to using litigation in a way that increased
249. See HANDLER, supra note 18, at 209-10.
250. SOUTHWORTH, supra note 10, at 150; see also SILVERSTEIN, supra note 19, at 163-64
(discussing the importance of raising the consciousness of the public).
251. Rhode, supra note 229, at 2043 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
252. Scott L. Cummings, Critical Legal Consciousness in Action, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 62,
64 (2007) (quoting Michael McCann & Helena Silverstein, Rethinking Law’s “Allurements”:
A Relational Analysis of Social Movement Lawyers in the United States, in CAUSE LAYWERING:
POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 241, at 261, 269
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
253. See SOUTHWORTH, supra note 10, at 166-67 (conservative lawyers); Southworth, supra
note 14, at 477 (civil rights lawyers).
254. See supra notes 108-16 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.2012] DISABILITY CAUSE LAWYERS 1339
public  support  for  disability  rights.
256  To  the  extent  they  were
looking  to  make  new  law,  it  was  limited  to  securing  favorable
interpretations of particular provisions of the ADA.
257 And, as other
commentators have noted, employment discrimination cases can
be a poor vehicle to pursue systemic reform.
258 Although not couched
in the language of academics, this was one of the main reasons most
lawyers  offered  for  generally  eschewing  ADA  employment  liti-
gation.
259
The lawyers did not embrace the notion of blindly relying on
courts to transform litigation gains into real change. Rather, the
interviewed lawyers viewed litigation, or the threat thereof, as the
first step of a process that continued well beyond the courthouse
door.
260 As one lawyer explained, winning in court only completes
“half the work.”
261 Disability cause lawyers were flexible on post-
dispute monitoring and implementation strategies, although they
exhibited some consensus that courts were the least preferred forum
and that monitors needed technical expertise that would ideally be
paid for by defendants.
262 Sometimes the lawyers advocated specific
reforms, but more often they started with higher-level goals that
were flexible enough to change and evolve over time.
263 The lawyers
256. See supra note 152; see, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 13, supra note 1 (“[W]e also are
attuned to the public support for disability rights. We want to emphasize that disability is
something that touches everybody in America at one time or another, whether personal[ly],
[or] with family members—in that [way] what disability rights is about is having a society
that is inclusive of everybody.”). 
257. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
258. See  Susan  Sturm,  Second  Generation  Employment  Discrimination:  A  Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 475 (2001); Suk, supra note 246, at 405-06 (advocating for
the use of increased regulation instead to achieve these outcomes).
259. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
260. See Interview with Lawyer 13, supra note 1 (dividing strategy into several parts: the
pre-dispute discussions, filing of a lawsuit, the “fix” or removal of discriminatory barriers, and
the monitoring); see also supra note 104.
261. Interview with Lawyer 9, supra note 51 (noting that one of his cases went on thirty-
two years and that he was used to “cases that go on forever”). Another lawyer noted that the
mission  of  the  P&A  network  system  was  to  remain  actively  involved  in  cases  at  the
monitoring stage. See Interview with Lawyer 12, supra note 47 (“We’ve got to litigate the case
and then we’ve got to stick around and make sure that [the consent decree] happens.”). 
262. Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 25.
263. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law
Litigation  Succeeds,  117  HARV.  L.  REV.  1015,  1019  (2004)  (noting  the  move  toward
“experimentalist regulation,” which “combines more flexible and provisional norms with
procedures for ongoing stakeholder participation and measured accountability”). 1340 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1287
emphasized including members from the disability community in
the ongoing compliance process, and several lawyers spoke about
how successful this tactic had been in the ongoing battle to change
organizational culture.
264 
The extent to which these lawyers described disengagement from
the Supreme Court reflected their pragmatic tendencies. In some
instances, they succeeded in getting nationwide compliance with
their preferred interpretation of the statute without a nationwide
ruling.
265 This separates their work from groups who have, at least
at some point in time, devoted resources to Supreme Court liti-
gation, often with the ultimate goal being a Court enunciation of a
new right. So, for example, “[i]n the desegregation campaign, cause
lawyers intentionally maneuvered the claim of ‘separate but equal’
as inherently unequal before the Court.”
266 Likewise, women’s cause
lawyers developed protections for sexual and reproductive freedom
through the concept of a constitutional right to privacy by arguing
landmark  cases  such  as  Griswold  v.  Connecticut
267  and  Roe  v.
Wade.
268 In the gay rights movement, advocates focused on the right
to privacy and liberty in sexual relations, resulting in the decrimi-
nalization  of  homosexual  sodomy  by  the  Court  in  Lawrence  v.
Texas.
269 Although the movement initially resisted the temptation
to put the issue of marriage equality before the Court and instead
focused on state supreme courts, even that issue will likely reach
the Supreme Court with some movement support,
270 if not over-
whelming enthusiasm, via Perry v. Schwarzenegger.
271 
The disability cause lawyers skillfully became involved, by means
such as strategy coordination and amicus briefs, in cases that had
264. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 107, 171.
266. Stein et al., supra note 4, at 1694.
267. 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (striking down a prohibition on contraceptives as applied
to married couples under the concept of a right to privacy).
268. 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (concluding that the “right to personal privacy includes the
abortion decision”).
269. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
270. See Carlos A. Ball, The Backlash Thesis and Same-Sex Marriage: Learning from
Brown v. Board of Education and Its Aftermath, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1493, 1501-04
(2006). 
271. 591 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2010) (preventing plaintiffs’ discovery requests related to a
challenge of the constitutionality of California's Proposition 8).2012] DISABILITY CAUSE LAWYERS 1341
otherwise arrived at the Supreme Court.
272 But these tactics differ
substantially from pursuing cases from the ground up to take to the
Court. In previous work, we noted that this strategy was in line
with the movement’s political and legal realities, although it did
generate costs.
273 The cases that have gone to the Supreme Court
have  had  some  singularly  poor  fact  patterns,
274  which  in  turn
discomforted judges and provided ready fodder for lampoon in the
media.
275 Our interviews revealed that lawyers were well aware of
these costs. Although the lawyers exhibited some sense that cause
lawyers  should  inject  themselves  into  more  Court  practice,  the
abstract  thinking  and  resource  investment  necessary  for  this
strategy was not a good fit with their general pragmatism about
using litigation to secure more immediate social change.
The disability cause lawyers were analogous to their peers from
other social movements in viewing litigation as one tool among
many at their disposal. Within the framework of legal change, these
lawyers  were  particularly  adept  in  advocating  for  and  securing
social transformation through the regulatory process
276 and through
state and federal legislatures.
277 This is reflective of the history of
the  disability  rights  movement,  which  has  successfully  passed
several favorable statutes.
278 They also reported that they viewed
272. See supra note 163.
273. See Stein et al., supra note 4, at 1693-94.
274. Sutton v. United Air Lines Inc., for example, included claims by twin plaintiffs with
severe myopia who sought accommodations as airline pilots. 527 U.S. 471, 471 (1999). Sutton
thus expressly opened the door to concerns about disability rights weighed against public
safety. See, e.g., Walter Olson, Disabling America, NAT’L REV., May 5, 1997, at 40 (noting that
ADA lawsuits are on a “collision course” with public safety).
275. At the oral argument in Sutton, Justice Scalia waved his glasses in the air, noting that
under the plaintiffs' preferred definition of the statute, seven out of nine Supreme Court
Justices could count as protected class members, as could a majority of Americans. See Walter
Olson, Under the ADA, We May All Be Disabled, WALL ST. J., May 17, 1999, at A27 (noting
Justice Scalia’s dramatics with approbation). On backlash against the ADA as seen through
the lens of media accounts, see generally Cary LaCheen, Achy Breaky Pelvis, Lumber Lung
and Juggler's Despair: The Portrayal of the Americans with Disabilities Act on Television and
Radio, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 223 (2000).
276. See Schuck, supra note 227, at 1772 (“Social reform through statutory interpretation
has  a  distinctive  dynamic....  [T]o  note  only  the  most  obvious  difference,  administrative
agencies ordinarily play central roles in effectuating statutory regimes. Their relationships
to courts, legislatures, and constituencies are pivotal in determining how judicial doctrines
are both shaped and implemented.”). 
277. See supra notes 182, 185.
278. See Interview with Lawyer 12, supra note 47 (“[W]e really have had some pretty1342 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1287
the results of litigation, even when unsuccessful, as being instru-
mental in helping to pass legislation.
279
The lawyers we interviewed also reported leveraging litigation in
forums outside of the legislature, including facilitating grassroots
mobilization and building up the public reputation of the disability
rights movement as one seeking equality and dignity, not welfare or
special treatment.
280 Beyond litigation, they participated in extra-
legal advocacy:
281 training self-advocates, increasing public educa-
tion,
282 and building coalitions with other civil rights groups.
283 The
disability cause lawyers also engaged the media to disseminate a
narrative of disability rights as an empowering concept.
284 They
were conscious of the limits of these alternative strategies while still
viewing them as an important part of their work. 
phenomenal success in getting disability statutes [passed].... So that may [allow us to] avoid
... having to always look to the constitutional issue.”). 
279. See Interview with Lawyer 2, supra note 51 (“[S]ometimes we have to litigate and lose
before the legislature is willing to do anything.”). On this phenomenon more broadly, see
NeJaime, supra note 12, at 945 (“Litigation loss may, counterintuitively, produce winners.
When savvy advocates lose in court, they may nonetheless configure the loss in ways that
result in productive social movement effects and lead to more effective reform strategies.”).
280. See also Bagenstos, supra note 189, at 1007-08 (noting how the ADA was agreeable
to both political parties on the issue of personal independence); Stein, supra note 216, at 664-
70 (arguing the equality theory of ADA accommodations). This, too, is consistent with efforts
and strategies of other groups. See Rhode, supra note 229, at 2041 (“Many leaders also
stressed more intangible but equally crucial advances in public awareness, social attitudes,
and client empowerment. Their organizations’ litigation and policy work ... has helped to raise
awareness, legitimate goals, mobilize support, attract funding, and gain leverage in dispute
resolution and policy settings.”). 
281. See Lobel, supra note 243, at 959 (describing the “sphere of action” outside the legal
arena as the “realm of civil society”). 
282. See Interview with Lawyer 6, supra note 57 (noting extensive public outreach efforts);
see also Interview with Lawyer 10, supra note 58 (“[I]f you know your rights, and you know
how to explain them to people, part of it is knowing how to be an effective self advocate, you
can [change] ... bureaucracies ... just through your effective advocacy.”).
283. See supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text; see also Rhode, supra note 229, at
2048-49 (describing efforts of public interest lawyers to build coalitions and communicate with
one another across groups). 
284. See  supra  notes  193-197;  see  also  Interview  with  Lawyer  10,  supra  note  58
(“[L]itigation is at its best [when] it’s trying to support goals that are bigger than the facts of
the case, and if you don’t have a strategy to tell the story of the case in a way that changes the
way people think about disability issues, you’re leaving some stuff on the table in terms of the
impact of the case.”). 2012] DISABILITY CAUSE LAWYERS 1343
2. Resource-Diverting
Related  to  the  court-centered  arguments  described  above,
commentators also consider reliance on litigation as an expensive
endeavor  that  misallocates  resources.  According  to  this  view,
lawyers, by nature, place too much faith in lawsuits and thereby
divert movement energy away from other avenues of social change,
including other forms of political mobilization.
285 Because courts are
counter-majoritarian institutions, they “lack the legitimacy, exper-
tise, and enforcement resources sometimes necessary for meaningful
institutional reform.”
286 Lawyers, furthermore, tend to divert re-
sources away from grassroots groups, neglect goals that may be
more important to a movement, and are insensitive to the poor
return they provide clients given the expense of litigation.
287
Other commentators have noted that cause lawyers may be more
cognizant of the costs they engender than these critiques suggest.
288
The lawyers we interviewed were sensitive to the resources con-
sumed by litigation
289 and acknowledged the limits of litigation
strategies.
290 Nevertheless, our interviews revealed two findings
that counter cause lawyering scholarship on the seduction of liti-
gation. First, the resource-siphoning critique is predicated on the
notion  that  cause  lawyers  pursue  damage  judgments  to  the
285. See, e.g., SOUTHWORTH, supra note 10, at 149-50; Lobel, supra note 243, at 949
(“Litigation entails high monetary costs and requires heavy investment of time and energy,
all of which inevitably decrease the ability of a movement to engage in alternative courses of
action.”); Rhode, supra note 229, at 2042-43.
286. Rhode, supra note 229, at 2043.
287. See, e.g., MICHAEL W. MCCANN, TAKING REFORM SERIOUSLY: PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC
INTEREST LIBERALISM 200 (1986) (warning that the use of law “absorb[s] scarce resources that
could be used for popular mobilization”). 
288. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 229, at 2043 (“Many leaders shared those concerns, and
noted that ‘victory in the courts does not necessarily mean victory in practice.’”). 
289. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 10, supra note 58 (“[T]he challenge with litigation is
[that] it can be very expensive, it can take a long time.”); Interview with Lawyer 11, supra
note 57 (“The cost of litigation is just way, way too high, and the numbers of lawyers on the
other side in these cases seemingly are endless. So as a result we really, for many reasons,
partner with either private firms or P&A’s ... to do the work.”). 
290. To this end, our interviews did not fully explore these lawyers’ collaboration with law
firms assisting them in their work on a pro bono basis, although some research has been
conducted on the topic. See Rhode, supra note 229, at 2070-75 (discussing collaboration of
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detriment  of  structural  reform.
291  By  contrast,  the  lawyers  we
interviewed focused almost exclusively on securing injunctive relief
in order to leverage structural reform within individual defendants
and their broader industries.
292 Damages are not typically available
under the ADA; when these lawyers sought damages under state
laws, they did so to create fear of liability and initiate a domino
effect on nonparty members of related industries.
293 
Second, the critique of litigation as a resource diversion presup-
poses that litigation is a lawyer-driven phenomenon. Yet our inter-
views revealed that some well-financed spheres of the disability
rights movement are pressing for litigation with a very concrete
sense of what social changes they hope to realize. Consequently, sev-
eral of the lawyers we interviewed functioned more like classic pri-
vate lawyers, whose clients hire them to accomplish discrete legal
objectives through the courts.
294 Some of these lawyers also demon-
strated what Professor Robert Nelson has referred to as a “lack of
autonomy” from the clients—when a powerful client’s repeat bus-
iness becomes a source of professional strength for the lawyer.
295
The cause lawyers may share ideological commitments with the
clients they serve, but they expressly observed they were not calling
the shots and were instead “strictly the chauffeur.”
296 The fact that
the NFB pays its lawyers by the hour, an unusual arrangement in
public interest law, reinforces this similarity.
297
The post-ADA disability rights movement started from a relative
position of power—an omnibus civil rights statute that formally
conferred protections and a private right of action—coupled with
291. See David Luban, Essay, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J.
2619, 2646 (1995) (suggesting a monetization of legal disputes, whereby cases are increasingly
settled through monetary payments at the expense of structural reforms).
292. See supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text. When rare but similar criticisms are
leveled against lawyers bringing ADA suits, they are directed against high-volume lawyers.
See supra note 48.
293. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
294. See ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE
LARGE LAW FIRM 232 (1988). 
295. Id. at 5. 
296. See supra note 91. The lawyer implied that although he drove the car, he was told
explicitly where to go. See also Interview with Lawyer 11, supra note 57 (“[T]his is a home for
[a particular community of people with disabilities].... They know that we’re going to listen
to their issues, and if we can ... we’re going to try to address them.”). 
297. See Interview with Lawyer 3 and Lawyer 4, supra note 52 (statement of Lawyer 3).2012] DISABILITY CAUSE LAWYERS 1345
tepid public enforcement.
298 This combination undoubtedly influ-
enced  the  choice  to  pursue  statutory  enforcement  litigation.
Nevertheless, the critique of cause lawyering as litigation-centric,
and, by nature, an overly narrow vehicle for dispute resolution, is
certainly relevant: most of the disability cause lawyers we inter-
viewed were focused on various stripes of ADA litigation.
299 Hence,
a cadre of the most talented and resourceful movement advocates
are focused on an antidiscrimination agenda to the detriment, per-
haps, of seeking more universal policy reforms such as healthcare
or employment.
300 Given the persistently low employment rates of
people with disabilities in the post-ADA period,
301 this is an insight
worth reflecting on.
302
3. Elite Cooption 
An additional concern with cause lawyering is that it creates
unhealthy dependency by movements on elites. Commentators refer
to this as the cooption effect of the legal profession on a social
movement.
303 Cooption can manifest itself through lawyers pushing
for outcomes that are not in their clients’ best interests, or in domi-
nating far-removed and rarely-consulted grassroots clients’ inter-
ests.
304  Because  lawyers  have  an  inherent  incentive  to  develop
298. See Michael E. Waterstone, A New Vision of Public Enforcement, 92 MINN. L. REV. 434,
440-41 (2007).
299. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
300. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 230, at 118-20 (contending that the antidiscrimination
agenda may even contribute to socioeconomic disparities because, despite its promise, it
cannot by itself unseat deeply entrenched social stigma).
301. See DAVID C. STAPLETON & RICHARD V. BURKHAUSER, THE DECLINE IN EMPLOYMENT
OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 4 (2003).
302. See Michael Ashley Stein & Penelope J.S. Stein, Beyond Disability Civil Rights, 58
HASTINGS L.J. 1203, 1204 (2007) (noting the inability of civil rights statutes alone to effectuate
change);  accord  Michael  Ashley  Stein  &  Michael  E.  Waterstone,  Finding  the  Gaps:  A
Comparative  Analysis  of  Disability  Laws  in  the  United  States  to  the  United  Nations
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY
22-24 (May 12, 2008), http://www.hpod.org/resources/human-rights (follow hyperlink under
“Reports”). 
303. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 243, at 952-53. 
304. See  GERALD  P.  LÓPEZ,  REBELLIOUS  LAWYERING:  ONE  CHICANO’S  VISION  OF
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE 2-3 (1992); see also GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE
COURT: THE SUPREME COURT  AND MINORITIES  IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 166-68 (1993)
(concluding that minorities have developed a dependence on Supreme Court decisions); Gary
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narratives with the best chance of winning a case, the client’s own
voice and diversity of interests are lost.
305 The depictions of the
Legal Defense Fund litigation that ended official school segregation
represents the classic reframing of cause lawyering: “The NAACP
lawyers marginalized, cabined, and outright repudiated class issues
through the complaints they pursued and those they ignored” so
that by the time Brown and its underlying strategy coalesced, the
cause lawyers had completely dominated any dissenting views.
306
As discussed above, nearly all the lawyers we interviewed came
from elite legal backgrounds, and in several instances they de-
scribed their work in ways that are consistent with the image of
advocates making key decisions about what litigation to pursue on
behalf of underprivileged groups.
307 To this end, it is worth noting
that several of the lawyers indicated a commitment to litigating on
behalf of people with disabilities who were “at the margins” and
possessed  the  least  political  clout,  specifically,  individuals  with
psycho-social disabilities.
308 Yet these lawyers also viewed them-
selves as being responsive to community need and putting their
litigation focus where the community thought it should go.
309 This
Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L. REV. 337, 341 (1978) (noting the capacity of public interest
lawyers  to  influence  client  choice);  Clark  D.  Cunningham,  The  Lawyer  as  Translator,
Representation as Text: Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
1298, 1300-01 (1992).
305. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of
Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991); see also NeJaime, supra note 235, at 545-46
(discussing a gay rights advocacy organization’s presentation of the “ideal” same-sex marriage
couple). 
306. See Risa L. Goluboff, “We Live’s in a Free House Such as It Is”: Class and the Creation
of Modern Civil Rights, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1977, 1979 (2003). 
307. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 25 (discussing the lawyer’s ability to
choose the type of litigation that she wanted to pursue); Interview with Lawyer 9, supra note
51 (“[W]e’re looking for cases that advance our overall mission.”).
308. See Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 51 (noting her desire to represent some
people who are “real outliers in society”); see also Interview with Lawyer 9, supra note 51
(noting how his organization represents individuals with “the most challenging disabilities
... [who] need this intensive intervention”). For a discussion of individuals with psycho-social
disabilities as being the most marginalized community of people with disabilities, see Michael
E. Waterstone & Michael Ashley Stein, Review Essay, Disabling Prejudice, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
1351 (2008). 
309. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text; see also Interview with Lawyer 13,
supra note 1 (“[To] a large extent we look to [disability] organizations for guidance on where
they want to see the legal team; we consider ourselves the legal arm of the movement. Where
do they want the legal [team] to focus its efforts?”). 2012] DISABILITY CAUSE LAWYERS 1347
is a largely untested proposition; none of the interviewed lawyers
offered much in the way of “movement” monitoring or checks to
ensure accountability, apart from those instances when lawyers
were retained hourly for litigation projects.
310 Many of the lawyers
had significant life experience with disabilities and deep connections
with various parts of the disability rights movement, and were often
people  with  disabilities  themselves.
311  This  is  harmonious  with
movement lawyers in other areas who share life experiences and
identities with the communities they represent. Others felt deeply
that litigation was reflective of community desires and helped give
their clients voice and restore power differentials.
312 
However, unlike other groups that have pursued systemic consti-
tutional litigation, the lawyers we interviewed file an extremely
small portion of test-case litigation under the ADA. Unlike the high-
stakes, preclusive nature of constitutional litigation, individuals
seeking to vindicate their own statutory rights can and do bring the
vast majority of ADA cases. Most ADA plaintiffs are not reliant on
disability cause lawyers to bring their cases. As is well documented,
the vast majority of ADA litigation involves Title I,
313 and the cause
lawyers we interviewed were not primarily operating under that
part of the statute.
314 Finally, it is worth noting, as discussed above,
that in many instances, the lawyers we interviewed brought cases
under the specific direction of their strong clients, which, like the
NFB or National Association of the Deaf (NAD), are large grassroots
membership organizations. 
310. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 2, supra note 51 (discussing use of hourly rate);
Interview with Lawyer 8, supra note 50.
311. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 7, supra note 50 (“[M]y husband uses a wheelchair
... [and] his younger brother was born with a pretty severe cognitive disability.”); Interview
with Lawyer 8, supra note 50 (“I am a blind attorney.”).
312. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 11, supra note 57 (“I think [litigation] empowers the
community to a great extent.”). 
313. See  Michael  Waterstone,  The  Untold  Story  of  the  Rest  of  the  Americans  with
Disabilities Act, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1822 (2005).
314. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.1348 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1287
III. DISABILITY CAUSE LAWYERS AND DISABILITY LAW 
Our interviews on the strategic motivations of modern disability
cause  lawyers  both  confirm  and  challenge  existing  scholarship,
thereby provoking a reassessment of how American disability law
functions in practice. The disability cause lawyers’ criticisms of the
Supreme Court are on par with those of academics. Nevertheless,
contrary to scholarly claims, the Court’s narrow interpretation of
the ADA has not undermined their daily activities.
315 Nor did the
advocates  agree  with  commentators  who  recommend increasing
the use of class actions.
316 Rather, they prefer focusing on disability-
specific cases whose settlements and verdicts in turn redound to the
benefit of the larger disabled community.
317 Moreover, disability
cause lawyers have developed effective litigation funding strategies
despite academic fears that Supreme Court curtailment of civil
rights attorney fees has thwarted public interest law. In conse-
quence—and  despite  highly  analyzed  Supreme  Court  decisions
—disability  cause  lawyers  have  made  significant  progress  in
bringing about social integration for Americans with disabilities.
318 
A. Beyond the Supreme Court 
A dominant  narrative  in  ADA  scholarship  has critiqued the
Supreme Court’s definition of disability and its attendant practical
319
315. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
316. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 11, supra note 57 (“[W]e do not file many class actions
because the relief we can get doesn’t always require a class action.”).
317. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 13, supra note 1 (“[W]e’re able to achieve systemic
relief without using the class action device ... [and] challenge actual policies that affect lots
of people.”).
318. For an account and analysis of this progress by disability cause lawyers, see Stein et
al., supra note 4, at 1682-85. 
319. For assessments from academics who contributed to the drafting of the ADA, see
Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., “Substantially Limited” Protection from Disability Discrimination:
The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability, 42 VILL. L.
REV.  409,  438-39  (1997);  Chai  Feldblum,  Definition  of  Disability  Under  Federal  Anti-
Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It? 21 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 139-41 (2000); Arlene B. Mayerson, Restoring Regard for the “Regarded as”
Prong: Giving Effect to Congressional Intent, 42 VILL. L. REV. 587, 587 (1997); Bonnie P.
Tucker, The Supreme Court’s Definition of Disability Under the ADA: A Return to the Dark
Ages, 52 ALA. L. REV. 321, 370 (2000). 2012] DISABILITY CAUSE LAWYERS 1349
and theoretical
320 implications for the development of disability-
based civil rights. In sum, academics analyzing the Court’s ADA
jurisprudence  have  noted  the  practical  bind  in  which  potential
plaintiffs have been placed—being disabled enough to fall within the
statute, yet not so disabled as to make claims to performing social
functions implausible—and the direct consequence of this catch-22,
namely, that plaintiffs are routinely turned away from court.
321
Within the employment realm, more than 93 percent of ADA claims
have been unsuccessful, with an overwhelming number losing at the
summary judgment stage for not adequately satisfying the defini-
tion of disability.
322 For these commentators, the Justices hold a
retrogressive view of disability as not belonging to the overall civil
rights  agenda,
323  a  perspective  that  has  impaired  the  ADA  and
resulted in the statute having a negligible impact.
324 
In our interviews, the disability cause lawyers generally agreed
with the scholars’ substantive criticisms of the Supreme Court’s
rulings and concurred in the view that the Court and the federal
320. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV.
397,  414-17  (2000);  Mark  Kelman,  Does  Disability  Status  Matter?,  in A MERICANS  WITH
DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 91,
91-92 (Leslie P. Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000); Stein, supra note 216, at 583.
321. See, e.g., Aviam Soifer, The Disability Term: Dignity, Default, and Negative Capability,
47 UCLA L. REV. 1279, 1327 (2000). See generally Bradley A. Areheart, When Disability Isn’t
“Just  Right”:  The  Entrenchment  of  the  Medical  Model  of  Disability  and  the  Goldilocks
Dilemma,  83  IND.  L.J.  181  (2008).  For  a  compilation  of  scholarship  in  this  area,  see
Waterstone, supra note 313, at 1814-17. 
322. See Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62
OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 240 (2001) (showing that defendants prevail in nearly 94 percent of ADA
Title I cases at the trial level that are appealed and in 84 percent of cases that reach the
courts of appeal); see also Amy L. Albright, 2008 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title
I-Survey Update, 33 MENTAL  &  PHYSICAL  L.  REP.  363, 365 (2009). Professors Stein and
Waterstone each served as ABA Mental and Physical Disability Law Commissioners. 
323. See, e.g., Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 22 (2000); Bonnie P. Tucker, The ADA’s Revolving Door:
Inherent Flaws in the Civil Rights Paradigm, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 335, 339 (2001). See generally
BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRETING DISABILITY RIGHTS (Linda H. Krieger ed.,
Univ. of Mich. Press 2003).
324. See, e.g., Scott Burris & Kathryn Moss, The Employment Discrimination Provisions
of the Americans With Disabilities Act: Implementation and Impact, 25 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J.  1,  31  (2007)  (concluding  that  Title  I  of  the  ADA  has  not  substantially  improved
employment rates among people with disabilities); see also STAPLETON & BURKHAUSER, supra
note 301 (publishing a number of empirical studies that endeavor to explain the post-ADA
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judiciary evinced hostility to disability-related suits.
325 Yet, in direct
contrast to the academic perspective, the disability cause lawyers
uniformly felt that the Court’s decisions had a very limited direct
impact on their daily activities.
326 This was in large measure due to
the fact that the disability movement advocates did not represent
the types of plaintiffs that courts excluded from ADA coverage.
327
Rather, these lawyers represented the blind community, the deaf
community, individuals with obvious mobility impairments, and
other  individuals  for  whom  even  the  most  restrictive  judicial
interpretation of “disability” has not been an issue.
328 Hence, our
findings reveal that disability cause lawyers have brought, and
continue  to  bring,  high-profile  and  successful  cases  despite  the
Court’s decisions, although perhaps in a narrowed issue area in the
face of a hostile Supreme Court. This suggests that the ADA’s im-
pact may be two tiered—one for individuals who clearly meet the
statute’s definition of disability and another for the larger group
that does not.
329 Depending on one’s view of the disability rights
movement, this may or may not be a positive thing.
330
Moreover, the interviewed lawyers were more disability-specific
than  cross-disability  in  their  representation.  The  high-profile,
structural ADA litigation these lawyers brought is readily observ-
able as disability-specific. No lawyer we interviewed had a concrete
325. See supra note 229.
326. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
327. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. We do not mean to imply that no
disability  cause  lawyers  represent  groups  facing  tougher  hurdles  on  the  “definition  of
disability” issue; we are confident that some do.
329. Along  similar  lines,  Professor  Bagenstos  noted  that  the  Court’s  ADA  coverage
decisions can be understood as correlated with how stigmatized the particular disabilities are
in given cases. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 230, at 37-39; see also Paula E. Berg, Ill/Legal:
Interrogating the Meaning and Function of the Category of Disability in Antidiscrimination
Law, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (1999). These accounts, however, focus on the distinctions
that have been made in ADA Supreme Court cases, not on the progressive nature of litigation
generally for certain categories of disabilities. 
330. One strand of disability rights thinking conceptualizes disability from a “minority
group model” standpoint. See, e.g., Harlan Hahn, Civil Rights for Disabled Americans: The
Foundation of a Political Agenda, in IMAGES OF THE DISABLED, DISABLING IMAGES 181, 184
(Alan Gartner & Tom Joe eds., 1987) (concluding that the achievement of rights for a more
limited group of individuals with more severe disabilities would be a positive development).
Other  disability  theorists  take  more  of  a  “universalist”  approach  and  prefer  more
expansive—though less focused—legal advances. See, e.g., Irving Kenneth Zola, Toward the
Necessary Universalizing of Disability Policy, 67 MILBANK Q. 401, 420-21 (1989). 2012] DISABILITY CAUSE LAWYERS 1351
cross-disability  strategy  for  pursing  litigation  campaigns  that
benefited the disability classification generally, although many felt
this was an admirable goal. Two of the authors have previously
written about the need for more disability class actions, ideally in
the employment realm and consisting of classes of individuals with
multiple disabilities.
331 Our interviews suggest that at this point, at
least within one community of people engaged in structural ADA
litigation, this idea is a fairly academic exercise.
332 
While most ADA cases have been resolved at the definition of
disability stage—and almost uniformly adversely for employment
claims—the typical ADA case brought by these lawyers progressed
further. When asked about the legal issues that determined their
cases, these disability cause lawyers did not point to the threshold
definition  of  disability.  Rather,  they  identified  the  following  as
dispositive: the reasonableness of requested accommodations, the
undue burden or direct threat defenses, or the interpretation of
other aspects of the statute’s reach and coverage.
333 As one lawyer
explained, “I think what’s going to happen in employment cases is
what’s largely happened to blindness employment cases.... [T]he
battle ground always has been reasonable accommodations and
direct threat, and I think we’re going to see that more in the ... pan-
disability sense.”
334 This supports an assertion among some com-
mentators that after the ADAAA, issues of reasonable accommoda-
tion will become more important.
335 
331. See Michael Ashley Stein & Michael E. Waterstone, Disability, Disparate Impact, and
Class Actions, 56 DUKE L.J. 861, 864 (2006).
332. In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and
denied current and former female Walmart employees class action certification to sue for
employment discrimination. 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547, 2556-57 (2011).
333. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 8, supra note 50 (“So I think we’re going to see a lot
more of [reasonable accommodation cases] and of course good old direct threat.”).
334. Id.
335. See, e.g., Mark C. Weber, Unreasonable Accommodation and Due Hardship, 62 FLA.
L. REV. 1119, 1123 (2010) (“After the ADAAA, attention will turn to what accommodations
employers must provide in order to comply with the Act.”); see also Ani B. Satz, Disability,
Vulnerability, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination, 83 WASH. L. REV. 513, 540 (2008) (“[B]y
including greater numbers of individuals in the protected class, the ADAAA will likely focus
more attention on whether accommodations impose an ‘undue hardship’ on an employer.”).1352 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1287
B. Circumventing Buckhannon
Scholars have been critical of the Court’s ruling in Buckhannon
Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health &
Human Resources,
336 averring that it undermines private civil rights
implementation and places increased pressure on public enforce-
ment officials.
337 Indeed, one influential work surveyed two hundred
public interest organizations and revealed that the greatest nega-
tive impact of Buckhannon is on paradigmatic test cases, such as
class actions seeking injunctive relief against government actors.
338
Further, the survey questioned assumptions in Buckhannon that led
the Court to label the plaintiff’s concerns—that meritorious but
expensive claims would be discouraged—as “entirely speculative
and  unsupported  by  any  empirical  evidence.”
339 O u r  i n t e r v i e w s
confirm Buckhannon’s chilling effect. Nearly every lawyer relied, at
least in part, on attorneys’ fees to fund his other docket and ac-
knowledged that it has become increasingly difficult to represent
civil rights claimants after Buckhannon.
340 
However, we also discovered a wholly unexamined phenomenon
—the disability cause lawyers’ strategies for operating in a post-
Buckhannon world. First, in cases when litigation challenged wide-
ranging access violations in large companies, the disability cause
lawyers felt it was nearly impossible for defendants to sufficiently
remedy  system-wide  breaches  in  time  to  moot  out  a  claim  for
relief.
341 Specifically, these lawyers turned the table on the Supreme
Court  by  applying  its  decision  in  Friends  of  the  Earth,  Inc.  v.
Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.,
342 to rebut mootness
336. 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
337. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 48, at 3; Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse
Doors to Civil Rights Litigants, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 537, 547 (2003); Pamela S. Karlan,
Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183, 207-08 (2003); David Luban,
Essay, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest Lawyers, 91
CALIF. L. REV. 209, 243-45 (2003); Waterstone, supra note 298, at 443-44.
338. See Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on Civil
Rights: The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L.
REV. 1087, 1092, 1105-08 (2007). 
339. Id. at 1092.
340. See supra notes 68, 80-82. 
341. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 7, supra note 50.
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challenges to recouping attorneys’ fees.
343 In Friends of the Earth,
the Court reasoned that mootness only occurs if subsequent events
make it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could
not reasonably be expected to recur.
344 For lawsuits alleging sys-
temic noncompliance with various disability access provisions, the
disability cause lawyers reported that even when agreement existed
on the nature of the barriers to be fixed, inertia and recidivism were
powerful enough forces to keep the case from becoming moot.
345 One
lawyer described a large class action against multiple stores that
revealed thousands of violations that the defendant then hurried to
fix in order to moot the claim.
346 Those emendations, however, would
invariably break down: “their general contractor would photograph
a compliant toilet, and three months later our guy would go in and
you could [see] from the photos it was a totally different toilet. They
pulled it out, put in a new one, and [had] done it wrong.”
347 
Second, several disability cause lawyers noted that Buckhannon
had led them to bring cases in jurisdictions where they could bring
stand-alone state law claims—or include state statutes that allowed
damage claims—thus escaping Buckhannon’s mootness dilemma.
348
The two jurisdictions most often mentioned in our interviews were
California and Massachusetts.
349 This is particularly noteworthy
because several of the lawyers who ascribed to this strategy did not
live in either of those jurisdictions. For some types of cases, par-
ticularly those involving technology and the Internet, the lawyers
felt that they could effect nationwide change by bringing suit in
these jurisdictions.
350 They reasoned that once a basic technological
343. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 7, supra note 50 (“Well, the great tool that the
Supreme Court has given us to fight [Buckhannon] is [Friends of the Earth].”).
344. See 528 U.S. at 190. The Court noted that otherwise, “the exception to mootness that
arises when the defendant’s allegedly unlawful activity is ‘capable of repetition, yet evading
review,’ could not exist.” Id.
345. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 7, supra note 50.
346. See id. (discussing Taco Bell’s actions in a case concerning inadequate plumbing
accommodations).
347. Id.
348. See supra note 69.
349. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 2, supra note 51 (California and Massachusetts);
Interview with Lawyer 3 and Lawyer 4, supra note 52 (statement of Lawyer 4) (California).
For California’s statutes, see CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 52(a), 54.3 (West 2006). For Massachusetts,
see MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93, § 103 (2006).
350. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer 2, supra note 51; see also Interview with Lawyer 31354 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1287
change was made in one jurisdiction, it ultimately would be repli-
cated nationally.
351 One lawyer succinctly explained that when the
subject matter is access to technology, “it doesn’t matter where I
bring the case. I can get a national result.”
352 As a result, that law-
yer estimated that 90 percent of his docket relating to technology
and access cases is in Massachusetts or the Northern District of
California.
353 
Thus, while not disputing the general ill effects of Buckhannon
for cause lawyers bringing civil rights cases, disability cause law-
yers have discovered ways to circumvent or mitigate the Court’s
ruling. 
C. Pursuing Justice, Daily 
Commentators on Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the
ADA and other civil rights statutes paint a bleak picture of social
justice in post-1990 America.
354 It is a portrait that is largely well-
earned,  especially  when  one  focuses  on  the  relative  disabled
employment rates.
355 Nonetheless, there has been steady and salient
and Lawyer 4, supra note 52 (statement of Lawyer 3) (“We are getting national relief [from
our cases].”).
351. See Interview with Lawyer 2, supra note 51.
352. Id. 
353. Id. We observed one other example of circumventing Buckhannon. At least one team
of lawyers we interviewed put a heightened premium on early negotiations with defendants
and  made  defendants’  waiver  of  their  Buckhannon  rights  a  condition  of  these  early
negotiations. See Interview with Lawyer 3 and Lawyer 4, supra note 52 (statement of Lawyer
3). In doing so, they relied on their track records of solving problems without resort to
expensive  litigation  and  engaging  defendants  from  a  combined  business  and  moral
perspective. Id. They also were able to offer a wealth of disability-specific knowledge—made
possible by deep connections with their individual and organizational clients—that proved
useful to defendants. Id.
354. See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, In the Name of Federalism: The Supreme Court’s Assault on
Democracy and Civil Rights, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 367, 387-90 (2002) (explaining the negative
impact of Buckhannon); Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J.
1141, 1142-43, 1149 (2002) (discussing the Court’s recent systematic efforts to limit antidis-
crimination provisions of the civil rights agenda); Peter J. Rubin, Essay, Equal Rights, Special
Rights, and the Nature of Antidiscrimination Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 564, 564-65, 567 (1998). 
355. As  of  2010,  the  unemployment-population  ratio  among  working-age  adults  with
disabilities, ages 16-64, was 81.4 percent; only 21 percent of working-age people with dis-
abilities reported that they were employed part- or full-time. See HARRIS INTERACTIVE, THE
ADA, 20 YEARS LATER: KESSLER FOUNDATION/NOD SURVEY OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
40 n.4 (2010), available at http://www.2010DisabilitySurveys.org/pdfs/surveyresults.pdf. For
that same age range, the ratio for those without a disability was 63.9 percent. Id.2012] DISABILITY CAUSE LAWYERS 1355
progress—which is largely undocumented
356—by disability cause
lawyers on behalf of their clients and the larger disability commu-
nity  in  helping  to  transform  society  through  social  integration
—what  seminal  disability  rights  advocate,  and  NFB  founder,
Professor  tenBroek  called  “the  right  to  live  in  the  world.”
357
TenBroek argued that the appropriate remedy for the historical
exclusion of disabled persons from mainstream society was partici-
patory justice—the notion that society has a moral imperative to
remove artificial barriers to inclusion.
358 This is because nothing is
“more essential to personality, social existence, economic opportu-
nity—in short, to individual well-being and integration into the life
of the community—than the physical capacity, the public approval,
and the legal right to be abroad in the land.”
359 Put another way,
“individuals  cannot  flourish  without  their  joining  with  other
humans in some sorts of collective activities.”
360 
One of the driving factors in passing the ADA was a desire to
counteract the social isolation historically experienced by persons
with disabilities.
361 Congress was presented with a catalog of evi-
dence on the historical exclusion of Americans with disabilities from
mainstream society, including eye-opening results of an independ-
ent nationwide poll of one thousand disabled persons.
362 That study
found that two-thirds of working-age people with disabilities were
unemployed, and that two-thirds of those individuals wanted to
work but could not do so because of employer attitudes.
363 The study
also reported that during the year preceding the ADA hearings,
356. But see Waterstone, supra note 298, at 441-43.
357. TenBroek, supra note 38, at 852. 
358. See id. at 910, 912-13, 917-18; see also Michael Ashley Stein, Disability Human Rights,
95 CALIF. L. REV. 75, 102 (2007). 
359. TenBroek, supra note 38, at 841.
360. Anita Silvers, People with Disabilities, in T HE  OXFORD  HANDBOOK  OF  PRACTICAL
ETHICS 300, 318 (Hugh LaFollette ed., 2003).
361. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2006) (discussing Congress’s findings and purpose for the
ADA). 
362. See HUMPHREY TAYLOR ET AL., LOUIS HARRIS & ASSOCIATES, THE ICD SURVEY OF
DISABLED AMERICANS: BRINGING DISABLED AMERICANS INTO THE MAINSTREAM, at i-iv (1986). 
363. Id. at 47-51. The results were summarized to Congress by the study’s president,
Humphrey Taylor, during hearings on the ADA. See Guaranteed Job Opportunity Act of 1987:
Joint Hearing on S. 777 Before the Subcomm. on Emp’t and Productivity and the Subcomm.
on  the  Handicapped  of  the  Comm.  on  Labor  and  Human  Res.,  101st  Cong.  9-10  (1987)
[hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Humphrey Taylor). 1356 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1287
nearly two-thirds of individuals with disabilities did not attend
movies; three-fourths of the disabled population did not see live
theater or music performances; two-thirds of disabled people did not
attend sporting events; 17 percent did not eat in restaurants; and 13
percent did not shop in grocery stores.
364 Empirically rigorous and
anecdotal evidence corroborated these findings.
365 As a result of
those hearings, Congress determined that people with disabilities
had been denied equal opportunities in society and discrimination
persisted  in  “critical  areas,”  including  employment,  education,
transportation, access to public services, and voting.
366 Moreover,
Congress concluded that the source of this exclusion was artificial,
sustained by the “continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary
discrimination and prejudice.”
367 Among the forms of unwarranted
exclusion encountered by people with disabilities on a daily basis,
Congress noted “the discriminatory effects of architectural, trans-
portation, and communication barriers.”
368 Accordingly, Congress
premised the ADA on the belief that society had to be redesigned to
allow the full integration of disabled people.
369 
Progress towards achieving a disability-inclusive society has been
assessed and documented in a series of reports conducted by the
National Council on Disability (NCD), an independent federal agen-
cy that has critically assessed American disability law and policy
364. TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 362, at 37-39.
365. For example, census data reported at that time that more than 20 percent of working-
age individuals with disabilities were below the poverty level. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE
HANDICAPPED, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE: AN ASSESSMENT OF FEDERAL LAWS AND PROGRAMS
AFFECTING PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 5 (1986). Previous testimony before the Senate had
concluded that “By almost any definition ... disabled Americans are uniquely underprivileged
and disadvantaged. They are much poorer, much less well educated and ... hav[e] much less
social  life,  enjoy  fewer  amenities  and  have  a  lower  level  of  life  satisfaction  than  other
Americans.” Hearings, supra note 363 (statement of Humphrey Taylor). The more compelling
anecdotal examples were personal testimonies by a wheelchair-using future under-secretary
of the Department of Education who was removed from an auction house for being deemed
“disgusting to look at;” individuals with Down Syndrome who were banned from a zoo because
of the zoo keeper’s fear they would frighten the chimpanzees; an academically competitive and
nondisruptive child who was barred from attending public school because of a teacher’s
allegation that his physical appearance “produced a nauseating effect” in classmates; and a
competent arthritic woman who was denied a job by a college because of its trustees’ belief
that “normal students shouldn’t see her.” See S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 104-05 (1989).
366. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (2006).
367. Id. § 12101(a)(8) (emphasis added).
368. Id. § 12101(a)(5).
369. See Stein & Stein, supra note 302, at 1208-09.2012] DISABILITY CAUSE LAWYERS 1357
and  its  implementation  since  1984,  six  years  before  the  ADA’s
passage.
370 NCD studies have consistently found that the employ-
ment provisions of the ADA have been poorly implemented, but that
the public accommodation provisions have been well-enforced.
371
Further, the studies have found that by making the physical and
cyber environments more accessible, the daily lives of people with
disabilities  have  improved.
372  To  illustrate  this,  NCD  members
visited every state to interview thousands of people with disabilities
and then issued a report entitled Voices of Freedom: America Speaks
Out on the ADA.
373 The report concluded that dramatic changes had
already ensued in altering the physical environment and enabling
social participation.
374 
Our interviews revealed that disability cause lawyers viewed
themselves as tasked with “making a point”—achieving daily vic-
tories that impact the lives of their clients and the broader disability
community in such ways as documented in the NCD reports—and
were  decidedly  uninterested  in  appearing  before  the  Supreme
Court.
375 Accordingly, these lawyers focused their efforts on imple-
menting some parts of the ADA rather than endeavoring to create
new legal rights. By focusing on public services and accommodation
suits  whose  settlements  and  verdicts  redound  to  the  national
370. An archive of NCD—and prior to 1990, the National Council on the Handicapped—
publications is available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications.
371. See NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, VOICES OF FREEDOM: AMERICA SPEAKS OUT ON
THE ADA (1995), available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/1995/07261995. 
372. See id. (relating the successful employment stories of those with disabilities who
received technological innovations after the ADA). 
373. See id.
374. See, e.g., id. (statement of Don Holder, Florida) (“Not too long ago, very few places
were accessible to people with disabilities. But today it’s different ... people with disabilities
can now get out into the world.”); id. (statement of Shelley Schwarz, Wisconsin) (“Before the
ADA, I couldn’t even shop with my  daughter for her first prom dress. But things have
changed, and I recently did shop with my daughter to buy clothes: for her job interview!”); id.
(statement of Denise Karuth, Massachusetts) (“Most people would not think that a blind
person who uses a wheelchair could travel independently, hold a job, and be a taxpayer. But
the transportation access requirements of the ADA allow me to make my 220-mile commute
to  Boston  from  my  home  in  Northampton  several  times  a  month.”);  id.  (statement  of
Stephanie Wells, Georgia) (“In Hall County, the public library, the court house [sic], science
center, school board building, and even the landfill are being made accessible. Without the
ADA, none of the improvements to these facilities would be under way.”); id. (statement of
Evelyn Williams, Mississippi) (“With  the  ADA, I finally have a role independent of my
husband. I can get into buildings, go grocery shopping, all on my own now.”). 
375. See supra notes 25, 108, 119-20 and accompanying text.1358 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1287
community of persons with disabilities,
376 disability cause lawyers
have made significant progress towards achieving the social inte-
gration envisioned by disability rights advocates such as tenBroek
and contained in the ADA. This progress has moved social integra-
tion close to the point where citizens, disabled or not, are able to
equally access opportunities and participate in society. Disability
cause lawyers have enabled this social transformation by enforcing
statutory rights in the shadow of the Supreme Court. 
CONCLUSION
Scholarship on cause lawyering has a key insight: lawyers matter.
The strategic decisions lawyers make, their relationships with their
clients, and their interactions with each other all impact the success
of a social justice movement’s march toward progressive change.
This Article breaks new ground by directly engaging leading dis-
ability rights cause lawyers on these topics. 
The  conclusions  we  reached  have  implications  for  both  the
general cause lawyering and the disability rights advocacy commu-
nities. The disability cause lawyers brought cases to “make a point”
by reforming corporate entities and their broader industry sectors.
Most of their other litigation decisions and strategies—whether to
pursue class actions, how much attention to devote to post-dispute
monitoring, and a general aversion to employment discrimination
claims—were  derivative  of  this  overarching  goal.  The  disability
cause lawyers did not seek Supreme Court engagement because
they viewed it as counterproductive and did not need to bring their
cases before the Court to attain their goals. If law reform were
needed, Congress provided a more conducive venue with a track
record of success.
The portrait of relentless pragmatism derived from our interviews
distances the disability cause lawyers from more dated conceptions
of what it means to be a cause lawyer and instead aligns them with
more recent accounts. The disability cause lawyers also expanded
the framework of cause lawyering, especially through their disen-
gagement with the Supreme Court. Our research demonstrates the
importance of directly engaging with lawyers when evaluating the
376. See supra text accompanying note 317.2012] DISABILITY CAUSE LAWYERS 1359
effect law has on social movements. The story our lawyers told had
not been previously expressed in scholarship on the ADA and its
supposed  inefficacy.  Although  they  did  not  pursue  employment
discrimination claims, these lawyers achieved victories in the realm
of public accommodation. Notably, they did so despite commenta-
tors’ pronouncements that Supreme Court decisions, both on the
ADA and on civil rights attorneys’ fees, would impair their ability
to litigate. A direct result of the lawsuits brought by disability cause
lawyers is that persons with diverse disabilities around the nation
are now able to participate in their communities through a variety
of social interaction. Thus, contrary to academic accounts, the law-
yers we interviewed were successfully pursuing justice on behalf of
people with disabilities in ways that improved their daily lives. 